How important are endogenous peer effects in group lending? Estimating a static game of incomplete information

Journal of Applied Econometrics

Volumn 28, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 864-882

  Li, Shanjun ^a   Liu, Yanyan ^b   Deininger, Klaus ^c  

^a Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881026971     PISSN: 08837252     EISSN: 10991255     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jae.2276     Document Type: Article

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