Why Be Emotional?

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Döring, Sabine A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Control of emotion; Guidance; Idea of agency; Judgements; Practical knowledge; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880614830     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.003.0013     Document Type: Chapter

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