Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 32, Issue , 2013, Pages 26-37

  Bearse, Peter ^a   Cardak, Buly A ^b   Glomm, Gerhard ^c   Ravikumar, B ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO   (United States)

^b LA TROBE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Calibration; Education vouchers; Majority voting; Partial voter turnout; Welfare gains

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880446112     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.06.005     Document Type: Article

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