Protecting rights from within? Inspectors general and national security oversight

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 65, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 1027-1086

  Sinnar, Shirin ^a  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84879748356     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (351)

1. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563-64 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
2. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2317-2319 (2006).
3. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1, 40-41 (2004).
4. Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1562 (2007).
5. Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 439-440 (2009).
6. Kent Roach, Review and Oversight of National Security Activities and Some Reflections on Canada's Arar Inquiry, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 53, 58-59, 61-62 (2007).
7. See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 1564-65;
8. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676, 677 (2005).
9. Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1549, 1573-1575 (2009).
10. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration (2007)
11. Johnsen, supra note 4;
12. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448 (2010); Pillard, supra note 7.
13. Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, at 99-109 (2012).
14. Ryan M. Check & Afsheen John Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA's Inspector General, 4 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 247 (2010).
15. Philip B. Heymann & Juliette N. Kayyem, Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror 114-117 (2005).
16. Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 357, 377-381
17. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3, at 42-43; Pillard, supra note 7, at 756-57; Roach, supra note 6
18. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 2, at 2347; see also
19. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 227, 304-305 (2006) (discussing narrow interpretations of IGs' mandate).
20. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 87 (2010)
21. see also Pillard, supra note 7, at 754.
22. Throughout this Article, I use the term "individual rights" to refer to the liberty or equality interests of individuals against the state, whether in the form of constitutional rights, civil rights or civil liberties derived from other sources of U.S. law, or broader notions of human rights.
23. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. (2011).
24. Paul C. Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for Accountability 11, 39, 43, 51-53 (1993).
25. Inspector General Act of 1978 § 2(2).
26. S. Rep. No. 95-1071, at 4 (1978); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-584, at 4-7 (1977). The Senate report on the 1978 IG Act expressly distinguished the purpose of the IGs covered by the statute from that of the Inspector General for Defense Intelligence. S. Rep. No. 95-1071, at 23.
27. George B. Lotz, The United States Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Programme: Balancing National Security and Constitutional Rights, in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants 109, 114 (Hans Born & Marina Caparini eds., 2007).
28. L. Britt Snider, A Unique Vantage Point: Creating a Statutory Inspector General at the CIA, Stud. Intelligence, Winter-Spring 2001, at 15, 15-16, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/ studies/winter_spring01/article02.pdf.
29. Staff of S. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th Cong., The Need for a Statutory Inspector General in the Department of Justice 41-45 (Comm. Print 1988)
30. (describing Justice Department opposition); S. Rep. No. 95-1071, at 24, 38 (describing Defense Department opposition); Check & Radsan, supra note 11, at 253-54 (describing CIA resistance).
31. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 97-252, sec. 1117, 96 Stat. 718, 750-753 (1982) (amending Inspector General Act of 1978).
32. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, sec. 150(a), 99 Stat. 405, 427 (1985) (amending Inspector General Act of 1978).
33. Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, sec. 102, 102 Stat. 2515, 2515, 2520 (amending Inspector General Act of 1978).
34. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-193, sec. 801, § 17, 103 Stat. 1701, 1711-12 (1989) (amending Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403q (2011)).
35. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 103(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2144.
36. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259, sec. 405, § 103H, 124 Stat. 2654, 2709-10 (amending National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-3h).
37. Id. sec. 431, 124 Stat. at 2731-32 (amending Inspector General Act of 1978). This Article focuses on presidentially appointed IGs, such as those at the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, and the CIA, and not on the relatively few national security agencies that have agency-appointed IGs.
38. Inspector General Act of 1978 § 3(a); see also
39. Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 Geo. L.J. 2027, 2029 (1998)
40. (noting the "expectation that IGs will survive a change in party control of the White House").
41. Inspector General Act of 1978 § 3(b).
42. Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC 26-27 (1999) (describing informational barriers to congressional oversight of national security agencies).
43. See, e.g., Snider, supra note 21, at 20 (reporting that the CIA had not invoked authority to interfere with CIA IG during the eight-year tenure of the first presidentially appointed IG).
44. N. Reback, Counsel to the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to author (Mar. 11, 2011) (on file with author).
45. M. Blier, Gen. Counsel to the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to author (Mar. 1, 2011)
46. Michael R. Bromwich, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., Epilogue: The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy: A Review of the Justice Department's Investigations and Prosecutions 1 (1998)
47. (reporting that the Attorney General blocked for six months the release of the report on whether U.S. government officials had protected California drug dealers linked to the Nicaraguan Contras).
48. Comm'n of Inquiry into the Actions of Can. Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities 391 (2006)
49. (reporting that Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice IGs believe that the reporting requirement prevents abuse of escape clauses).
50. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app.
51. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act 20 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Patriot Act Report (Mar. 2006)].
52. Homeland Security Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, sec. 8303, § 705(a), 118 Stat. 3867, 3867
53. (amending Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)); id. sec. 8304, § 8I, 118 Stat. at 3868 (amending Inspector General Act of 1978).
54. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 106A, 119, 120 Stat. 192, 200-02, 219-21 (2006).
55. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 301(b)(1), 122 Stat. 2436, 2471.
56. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act 5, 10-17 (July 2002).
57. The IG lists such reviews in its semiannual reports to Congress on implementation of Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act. See Special Reports,
58. Off. of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/special.htm (last updated Apr. 2013).
59. This number excludes reports that only analyzed agency responses to earlier IG recommendations, but counts separately follow-up reports based on additional investigation. These twenty-one reports cover fourteen separate topics. Cf. Roach, supra note 6, at 76-78 (explaining the importance of self-initiated audits and investigations).
60. Office of the Inspector Gen., Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003) 1-2 (2004) [hereinafter CIA Interrogations Report].
61. See Complaint at 5-6, ACLU v. CIA, No. 1:11-CV-00933 (D.D.C. May 18, 2011) (suing under FOIA to obtain six enumerated CIA IG reports); see also Douglas Jehl, Questions Left by C.I.A. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2005, at A1.
62. Carrie Johnson et al., Inquiry into CIA Practices Narrows; Ex-Agency Directors Urge Administration to Drop Investigation, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 2009, at A1.
63. CIA's Watchdog: No Problem with NYPD Partnership, The Capital, Dec. 24, 2011, at A3. My FOIA request to the CIA IG for this report, made in May 2012, is still pending.
64. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Def., Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse (2006).
65. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Def., Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Mind-Altering Drugs to Facilitate Interrogations of Detainees (2009).
66. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Def., The Threat and Local Observation Notice (TALON) Report Program (2007)
67. [hereinafter Talon Report]; see also IG Monthly Newsletter, U.S. Dep't of Def., Off. of Inspector Gen. (May 2011),
68. http://www.dodig.mil/eletter/2011/May2011.html (listing a classified June 2011 report on "questionable intelligence activities").
69. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria (2008)
70. [hereinafter Maher Arar Report]; Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
71. Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (2009).
72. Jack Goldsmith, NSA IG was denied a request to see the Office of Legal Counsel analysis supporting the program. Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 181-182
73. Offices of Inspectors Gen. of the U.S. Dep't of Def., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Nat'l Sec. Agency, and Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program (2009).
74. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Semiannual Report to Congress: October 1, 1992-March 31, 1993, at 6 (1993).
75. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 1996-September 30, 1996, at 2 (1996); Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Semiannual Report to Congress: October 1, 1995-March 31, 1996, at 4-5 (1996).
76. The IG's semiannual reports to Congress reference a 1995 review of violence committed against U.S. civilians in Guatemala, Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 1995-September 30, 1995, at 2 (1995), a 1997 review of FBI laboratory practices in terrorism prosecutions, Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Semiannual Report to Congress: October 1, 1996-March 31, 1997, at 2 (1997), and a 2001 investigation of the failure to disclose evidence in the Oklahoma City prosecution, Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 2001-September 30, 2001, at 35 (2001).
77. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text (noting fourteen distinct Department of Justice IG reviews, seven CIA IG reviews, three Defense Department IG reviews, and two Department of Homeland Security reviews in this time period addressing individual rights questions in the national security context, in addition to a joint IG investigation of the President's Surveillance Program). Determining which reviews address rights is itself subjective, given that apart from the Justice Department, which lists reviews relevant to its Patriot Act responsibilities, agencies do not categorize which reviews they consider related to rights. Here, I have defined rights broadly to include the liberty or equality interests of individuals against the state, whether in the form of constitutional rights, civil rights or civil liberties derived from other sources of U.S. law, or broader notions of human rights. I identified reviews that substantially engage questions of rights in the national security context, not those that may have merely peripherally raised such questions, although again, these choices necessarily involve some subjectivity.
79. Heymann & Kayyem, supra note 12, at 115; Clark, supra note 12, at 377-78, 380-81; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3, at 42.
80. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
81. The other DHS IG report between September 2001 and September 2011 directly addressing individual rights concerns in the national security context assesses a DHS program established to assist individuals with federal screening and border crossing procedures.
82. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (2009). Of these two reviews, I focused on the Arar rendition review because it addressed the rights implications of a national security practice rather than auditing a program specifically set up to address a civil liberties problem. Beyond these two reviews, DHS has investigated other national security programs affecting liberty but with an exclusive or nearly exclusive focus on effectiveness considerations. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
83. Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation (2009);
84. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Survey of DHS Data Mining Activities (2006). Other DHS IG reports address DHS department-wide compliance with federal privacy laws or the protection of personally identifiable information in data systems. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
85. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Privacy Stewardship (2010);
86. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
87. Better Administration of Automated Targeting System Controls Can Further Protect Personally Identifiable Information (Redacted) (2007).
88. A DOD IG report investigating allegations of the use of mind-altering drugs on de tainees was released in redacted form in 2012, after the completion of this Article. Another important rights-related DOD IG report addresses DOD investigations of detainee abuse but without drawing on an independent investigation. See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Def., supra note 60.
89. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., The Performance of 287(g) Agreements (2010).
90. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks 195 (2003) [hereinafter September 11 Detainees Report].
91. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Supplemental Report on September 11 Detainees' Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (2003) [hereinafter Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report].
92. September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 195, 197.
93. Id. at 111-13, 162; Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 8.
94. Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 11, 12, 16
95. September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 3
96. Lessons Learned-The Inspector General's Report on the 9/11 Detainees: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8, 12 (2003) [hereinafter Lessons Learned Hearing] (testimony of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice) (noting that the Department "fully cooperated" with review and required the redaction of only a "few phrases and words").
97. Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 40-42.
98. Steven Fainaru, Report: 9/11 Detainees Abused; Justice Dept. Review Outlines Immigrant Rights Violations, Wash. Post, June 3, 2003
99. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Report Faults the Roundup of Illegal Immigrants After 9/11, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2003,
100. Cam Simpson, Government Report Faults Handling of 9/11 Detainees, Chi. Trib., June 3, 2003, at 1.
101. See Oversight Hearing: Law Enforcement and Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2005); Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 84; U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
102. Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 84, at 2, 4, 16, 22, 77
103. Fainaru, supra note 86; Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Defends Detentions as Immigrants Recount Toll, N.Y. Times, June 5, 2003, at A23
104. U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 87
105. Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 43-45; September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 187-194.
106. See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Analysis of DOJ and DHS Security Responses (2003); Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Analysis of the Second Response by the Department of Justice to Recommendations in the Office of the Inspector General's June 2003 Report on the Treatment of September 11 Detainees (2004) [hereinafter Analysis of the Second Response]; Office of the Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice, Analysis of the Response by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to Recommendations in the OIG's December 2003 Report on the Abuse of September 11 Detainees at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, Special Report (2004).
107. Analysis of the Second Response, supra note 92, at 6.
108. Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Undersec'y, Border & Transp. Sec., to
109. Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/united_states/ICE_implementation_of_ detention041304.pdf.
110. Richard B. Schmitt & Richard A. Serrano, Inaction in New York Prison Abuse Stirs Anger, L.A. Times, May 21, 2005, at A13; see also Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 1-2, 7.
111. Patriot Act Report (Mar. 2006), supra note 49, at 14.
112. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act 9 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter Patriot Act Report (Aug. 2006)].
113. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of National Security Letters 8-9 (2007) [hereinafter NSL 2007 Report].
114. Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 2005
115. Glenn Greenwald, Shocking New Revelation: Unchecked Government Powers Get Abused, Salon (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.salon.com/2008/03/06/nsls.
116. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 119, 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006).
117. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records (2010) [hereinafter Exigent Letters Report]; Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the FBI's Use of National Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006
118. (2008) [hereinafter NSL 2008 Report]; NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98.
119. NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at 66-67.
120. NSL 2008 Report, supra note 102, at 132.
121. NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at xxxiv, xxxviii.
122. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 45-47.
123. NSL 2008 Report, supra note 102, at 161-63; NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at 125
124. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 256.
125. Id. at 256 n.270; see also David Hechler, Who Will Take the Fall?, Corp. Couns., June 1, 2010, at 22
126. Id. To date, no DOJ IG semiannual or Patriot Act report to Congress refers to any such discipline taken
127. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 214
128. NSL 2008 Report, supra note 102, at 161
129. Matthew Korade, National Security Letters Draw Further Fire at Senate Judiciary Hearing, Cong. Q. Homeland Sec. (Apr. 23, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 7883570;
130. Keith Perine, FBI Director Argues Against Patriot Act Rewrite, Requests Broader Power, Cong. Q. Today (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.cq.com/doc/news-2479078;
131. Ari Shapiro, FBI Investigations Faulted in Scathing Report, Nat'l Pub. Radio (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7812242.
132. FBI's Use of Exigent Letters 'Sloppy' but Agency Reforming, House Judiciary Told, Comm. Daily, Apr. 15, 2010,
133. available at 2010 WLNR 8097779 [hereinafter FBI's Use of Exigent Letters 'Sloppy'] (reporting that Representative James Sensenbrenner told FBI officials he felt "betrayed" because he had long defended the administration's antiterror-ism policies while the FBI continued to evade civil liberties protections).
134. CIA Interrogations Report, supra note 56, at 1-2.
135. Id. at 20-21 & n.26, 37; see also Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative, 26 Op. O.L.C., 2002 WL 34501675, at *1 (Aug. 1, 2002) (stating that legal opinion was limited to facts provided by CIA and would not necessarily apply if facts were to change).
136. Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative, 26 Op. O.L.C., 2002 WL 34501675, at *1; CIA Interrogations Report, supra note 56, at 44-45.
137. CIA Interrogations Report, supra note 56, at 21 n.26.
138. Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Tells of Changes for Its Internal Inquiries, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2008, at A9
139. Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, C.I.A. Watchdog Becomes Subject of C.I.A. Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 2007
140. at A1. In addition, one journalist has described a meeting between Vice President Cheney and CIA IG John Helgerson, following the initial interrogations review, as an attempt at intimidation.
141. Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals 288-89 (2008).
142. Helgerson himself, however, has disputed that characterization and has described the meeting as a briefing for the Vice President without any pressure to change his conclusions. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 277-78 n.73.
143. Mark Hosenball, Report Reveals CIA Conducted Mock Executions, Newsweek, (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/20/report-reveals-cia-conducted-mock-executions.html.
144. Douglas Jehl, Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics in Interrogation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2005, at A1.
145. Hosenball, supra note 130
146. Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee, 2005 WL 6334005, at *4, *9, *31 n.51 (Op. O.L.C. May 10, 2005).
147. Mayer, supra note 129, at 288, 294;
148. Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. Times Mag. (Sept. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/magazine/09rosen.html.
149. Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists 115 (2009) [hereinafter OPR Report].
150. Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee, 2005 WL 6334005, at *1, *34; Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, 29 Op. O.L.C., 2005 WL 6334006, at *1, *18 (May 10, 2005).
151. Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, 2005 WL 6334007, at *1 (Op. O.L.C. May 30, 2005).
152. Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, Exclusive: Only Three Have Been Waterboarded by CIA, ABC News (Nov. 2, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/ 11/exclusive-only.
153. See, e.g., Check & Radsan, supra note 11, at 291
154. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Who Wrote Terror Memos, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2010,
155. at A1. From the public evidence, it is difficult to separate out the impact of the IG report on the reported cessation of waterboarding from that of the explosive Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal and the leaking of OLC legal memos. In addition, in 2012, fresh allegations of a previously unre-ported instance of waterboarding have raised new questions about the CIA's official account of the program. See Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Libyan Alleges Waterboarding by C.I.A. in Afghanistan, Rights Group Says, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2012, at A9.
156. Ken Dilanian, CIA Avoiding Interrogations, Chi. Trib., Apr. 11, 2011, at C10;
157. Greg Miller & Julian E. Barnes, Obama Orders Gitmo, CIA Prisons Closed, Chi. Trib., Jan. 23, 2009, at C6.
158. Marisa Taylor, FBI Chief Vows to Protect Terror Detainees from Rendition, McClatchy Newspapers (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/09/16/ 75556/fbi-chief-vows-to-protect-terror.html.
159. Daniel Klaidman, Independent's Day, Newsweek, July 20, 2009,
160. 41; Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, Holder Opens Inquiry of CIA Interrogations, L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1; see also Attorney Gen.
161. Eric Holder, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/08/ag082409.html.
162. See Complaint 1, 11, 64, 66, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV-04-0249), aff'd, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
163. Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 6
164. Complaint, supra note 145, ¶¶ 51-52, 54, 58.
165. Comm. of Inquiry into the Actions of Can. Officials in Relation to
166. Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations 9 (2006) [hereinafter Arar Commission Report], available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rec-eng.pdf
167. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d. Cir 2009) (en banc); Editorial, Tortured Justice, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2008, at A28.
168. Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 37, 41-42.
169. See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
170. The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria (Unclassified Summary) (2008), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-18_Mar08.pdf.
171. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security Inspector General Report OIG-08-18, 'The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria': Joint Hearing of the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights, & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 30, 32 (2008) [hereinafter Joint Hearing on Arar] (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
172. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 564, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
173. Joint Hearing on Arar, supra note 155, at 26 (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
174. See Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 18.
175. Letter from Clark Kent Ervin, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (July 14, 2004), reprinted in Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, app. D at 43-44 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (affirming dismissal of Arar's claims against the Attorney General and other senior government officials for violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act and the Due Process Clause).
176. Joint Hearing on Arar, supra note 155, at 27-28 (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
177. Id. at 19 (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
178. See id. at 28 (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
179. at 75-76 (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.). The IG finally interviewed the Deputy Attorney General following the hearing, but did not change any findings. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria: Addendum 1 (2010).
180. Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 35-36
181. Walter Pincus, Defense Facilities Pass Along Reports of Suspicious Activity; 'Raw Information' from Military, Civilians Is Given to Pentagon, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 2005, at A12; Is the Pentagon Spying on Americans? (NBC television broadcast Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10454316/ns/nbcnightlynews-nbc_news_ investigates/t/pentagon-spying-americans.
182. Pincus, supra note 173; Is the Pentagon Spying on Americans?, supra note 173. Is the Pentagon Spying on Americans?, supra note 173.
183. Letter from Representative Zoe Lofgren to Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Dec. 30, 2005), reprinted in Talon Report, supra note 62, app. B at 17-19; Letter from Representative Anna G. Eshoo to Thomas Gimble, Acting Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Jan. 12, 2006), reprinted in Talon Report, supra note 62, app. C at 20-21.
184. Pentagon Admits Errors in Spying on Protesters, NBCNews.com (Mar. 10, 2006), www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11751418/ns/us_news/t/pentagon-admits-errors-spying-protestors.
185. See Talon Report, supra note 62, at iii
186. Walter Pincus, Pentagon to End Talon Data-Gathering Program, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 2007, at A10 (internal quotation mark omitted)
187. Press Release, Sgt. Sara Wood, Am. Forces Press Serv., Defense Department to Close Talon System (Aug. 21, 2007)
188. Talon Report, supra note 62, at i-ii, 8
189. Review of the Talon Reporting System (undated), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/talon_review_20070117.pdf
190. ACLU, ACLU Report Shows Widespread Pentagon Surveillance of Peace Activists (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-report-shows-widespread-pentagon-surveillance-peace-activists.
191. Talon Report, supra note 62, at i-ii, 5-8, 11.
192. See Undersec'y of Def. for Policy, U.S. Dep't of Def., Pub. No. 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons 16-18 (1982).
193. Talon Report, supra note 62, at 5, 7.
194. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of Terrorist Threats to DoD Within the United States (May 2, 2003), reprinted in Talon Report, supra note 62, app. F, at 30-31; see also Review of the Talon Reporting System, supra note 184, at 1-2 (noting that the wording of the 2003 memo led to different interpretations on what could be reported through Talon).
195. Talon Report, supra note 62, at 5.
196. See Review of the Talon Reporting System, supra note 184, at 1 (reporting concern that limits on retaining records with U.S. person information would hinder long-term tracking of terrorist threats).
197. Anna G. Eshoo et al., U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, to Claude M. Kicklighter, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Def. (June 27, 2007), available at http://eshoo.house.gov/images/documents/Intel/ talon%20%20letter%20to%20ig_6_27_2007.pdf.
198. See Clark, supra note 12, at 362-63 (arguing that accountability mechanisms may be effective even if they operate at only one of four "stages" of accountability, if other mechanisms are in place to address other stages).
199. David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1199, 1202 n.10, 1212
200. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016, 1016-1021 (2004)
201. William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 127, 145-156 (2004).
202. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 4(a)(5), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. (2011).
203. Heymann & Kayyem, supra note 12, at 109-10; Clark, supra note 12, at 404-05;
204. Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 =? What Counts in Counterterrorism, 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 559, 618-620 (2006).
205. Inspector General Act of 1978 §§ 4(a)(5), 5(c). CIA semiannual reports are not required to be made public. See 50 U.S.C. § 403q(d)(1).
206. Pillard, supra note 7, at 692
207. Inspector General Act of 1978 § 5(a)(1)
208. Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial-Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1302-1304, 1334 (2003).
209. See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 4(a)(5).
210. See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying civil liberties groups' attempts to uncover through FOIA the number of times the government had used surveillance tools authorized by the Patriot Act, including NSLs); see also Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the government completely redacted a listing of NSLs issued in a document released pursuant to an ACLU FOIA request), vacated in part as moot, Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
211. NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at xvi-xviii, xlv.
212. See NSL 2008 Report, supra note 102, at 4, 76 (describing separate IG analysis of FBI audit); NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at ix; see also Cuéllar, supra note 13, at 231-32 (arguing that audits provide untapped potential to check executive discretion in areas where judicial review proves inadequate).
213. See September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 7
214. Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 6 & n.7
215. See Mayer, supra note 129, at 288, 294
216. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text
217. Ken Dilanian, CIA Avoids Charges: Officers Won't Be Prosecuted over the Destruction of Interrogation Tapes, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at A14;
218. Peter Finn & Julia Tate, Destruction of Tapes Caused Concern at CIA, Wash. Post, April 16, 2010
219. at A3. According to a Deputy Assistant IG, the IG's office viewed the videotapes in an overseas facility without taking custody or making copies of them. ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 827 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). It is unclear what input the CIA IG provided regarding the potential destruction of the videotapes, although there is evidence that the IG told CIA officials that his office no longer required the videotapes for its investigation, which some CIA officials represented as providing clearance for their destruction. See id. at 225-26.
220. Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 21, 26-27, 29.
221. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307(JG), 2006 WL 1662663, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009); see also al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 954 n.6, 981 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Benatta, No. 01-CR-247E, 2003 WL 22202371 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2003); Docket, Benatta, 2003 WL 22202371 (No. 1:01cr00247).
223. Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
224. Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663, at *3-4.
225. See, e.g., Brief for Ibrahim Turkmen et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11-20, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4805227 (submitting information obtained in discovery from OIG interview notes with numerous officials, including FBI Director Robert Mueller and Bureau of Prisons Director Kathy Hawk Sawyer).
226. Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Five New York Men Detained and Abused in Post-9/11 Immigration Sweeps Settle Case for $1.26 Million (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/five-new-york-men-detained-and-abused-post-9/11-immigration-sweeps-settle-ca.
227. The Supreme Court established a heightened pleading standard in the related case of Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, leading the Second Circuit to vacate and remand part of the district court's ruling in Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546-47 (2d Cir. 2009). However, other Turkmen plaintiffs amended the complaint once more to plead senior Justice Department officials' personal involvement in greater factual detail. Fourth Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Turkmen, No. 02-CV-2307(JG) (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), 2010 WL 6000431.
228. Joint Hearing on Arar, supra note 155, at 13 (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
229. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case 23 (2006) [hereinafter FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case].
230. Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 38.
231. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
232. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 113 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 331 F.3d 918.
233. See September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 20-23. On the other hand, the IG review may have encouraged the district court to rule in favor of FOIA disclosure: in rejecting one FOIA exemption, that court noted that concerns over the post-9/11 detentions were "sufficiently substantial" that the IG had initiated an investigation. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 105-06.
234. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the FBI's Investigation of Certain Domestic Advocacy Groups 1 (2010) [hereinafter Review of the FBI's Investigation of Domestic Advocacy Groups]; Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq (2008).
235. 50 U.S.C. § 431(c)(3) (2011); ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 827 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
236. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
237. Lawsuits preceding the IG reports had successfully challenged the "gag order" provisions applicable to NSL recipients, but not other provisions of the law more directly affecting targets. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005), vacated as moot, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated in part as moot, Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415. In addition, at the time the IG first declared the FBI's use of exigent letters improper and illegal, no potential plaintiff would have known that the government used exigent letters.
238. Pillard, supra note 7, at 740
239. September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 29, 35-36
240. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 550 (2d Cir. 2009)
241. See Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 11, 260-63; NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at 95-98
242. NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at 95
243. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 263 & n.278
244. The Justice Department later acknowledged that the provision in question was 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), which pertains to the voluntary disclosure of international communications. See Complaint ¶ 8, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep't of Justice, 892 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:11-CV-00939-RJL);
245. Marisa Taylor, Obama Assertion: FBI Can Get Phone Records Without Oversight, McClatchy Newspapers (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/11/108562/obama-assertion-fbi-can-get-phone.html.
246. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 268
247. See Pillard, supra note 7, at 710-12
248. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 263-64 & n.278
249. September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76 at 106, 108
250. See OPR Report, supra note 135, at 100-01
251. Initial news reports about the IG report said it had concluded that the CIA's practices amounted to unlawful "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment," see Jehl, supra note 131, but the publicly released version only notes that the OLC legal opinions did not consider the question, see CIA Interrogations Report, supra note 56, at 101.
252. CIA Interrogations Report, supra note 56, at 101.
253. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 11; NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at 96-97
254. September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 71
255. Talon Report, supra note 62, at 8
256. Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 35
257. Id.; see also Joint Hearing on Arar, supra note 155, at 77, 117 (testimony of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
258. Pressed in a congressional hearing, DHS IG Skinner went somewhat further, refusing to rule out the possibility that the government had sent Arar to Syria to face coercive interrogations and agreeing that the incident might state a prima facie criminal violation of U.S. law. Joint Hearing on Arar, supra note 155, at 53, 74 (testimony of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
259. Rice Admits U.S. Erred in Deportation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2007, at A10.
260. I do not address the DOJ IG's separate mechanism for addressing individual complaints of civil liberties violations, which appears to have been used primarily by Muslim inmates in federal prisons alleging discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act 5-16 (Aug. 2011) (describing individual complaints received).
261. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
262. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 102 n.126.
263. September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 37-40.
264. Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 1-2, 7.
265. Patriot Act Report (Mar. 2006), supra note 49, at 14.
266. See, e.g., September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 186.
267. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 256.
268. Id. at 256 n.270; see also Hechler, supra note 113 (discussing Deputy General Counsel Julie Thomas's departure from the agency).
269. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 213.
270. Charlie Savage, Senate Extends Term of F.B.I. Director, N.Y. Times The Caucus (July 27, 2011), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/senate-extends-term-of-f-b-i-director.
271. Klaidman, supra note 144, at 35; Meyer & Miller, supra note 144; see also Holder, supra note 144.
272. Scott Shane, No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A., N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-out-prosecutions-in-cia-interrogations.html.
273. The DHS IG said it had referred information to the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility regarding individuals in the Acting Attorney General's office. Joint Hearing on Arar, supra note 155, at 57 (testimony of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.). No public information has been released about any Office of Professional Responsibility review.
274. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 214.
275. Supplemental Metropolitan Detention Center Report, supra note 77, at 43-45 (calling for better training of prison guards and development of a policy on videotaping detainees); NSL 2008 Report, supra note 102, at 161-63 (recommending better recordkeep-ing, training, and guidance on NSL use and oversight); NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at 124-25 (recommending improved tracking and documentation of NSLs and greater involvement of agency counsel); September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 188, 190 (advocating better consultation within and among agencies on detainee issues and concerns).
276. See Analysis of the Second Response, supra note 92, at 6.
277. See NSL 2008 Report, supra note 102, at 15 (finding "significant progress" in implementing recommendations but warning that it was "too soon" to conclude that new controls would fully eliminate the problems identified); Patriot Act Report (Aug. 2006), supra note 97, at 9 (noting that all but one of the original twenty-one recommendations were fulfilled).
278. NSL 2008 Report, supra note 102, at 22-23.
279. NSL 2007 Report, supra note 98, at 48, 65, 67.
280. See Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 263-68.
281. The DOJ IG's request that Congress control the FBI's ability to rely on the statutory provision in question appears to be the sole DOJ IG recommendation directed at Congress among the entire set of twenty-two national security rights-related DOJ IG reports published between 2001 and 2011.
282. See FBI's Use of Exigent Letters 'Sloppy,' supra note 120.
283. Lisa Mascaro, Patriot Act Provisions Extended Just in Time, L.A. Times (May 27, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/27/nation/la-na-patriot-act-20110527.
284. National Security Letter Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong.; S.
285. 2088 (110th): National Security Letter Reform Act of 2007, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s2088
286. (last visited May 3, 2013) (indicating that bill died after referral to committee); National Security Letters Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3189, 110th Cong.;
287. H.R. 3189 (110th): National Security Letters Reform Act of 2007, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr3189
288. (last visited May 3, 2013) (indicating that the bill died after referral to committee).
289. USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009, S. 1692, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1692
290. (111th): USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1692
291. (last visited May 3, 2013) (indicating that the bill died after being reported to committee).
292. September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 190; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2012).
293. Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, supra note 94; see also
294. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration: Mind Over Matter, 5 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 201, 230-231 (2005).
295. See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act 10 (Sept. 2004).
296. See Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2528, 108th Cong. (2004); S.
297. 2528 (108th): Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2004, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/s2528 (last visited May 3, 2013)
298. (indicating that the bill died after referral to committee); Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 4591, 108th Cong. (2004);
299. H.R. 3189 (110th): National Security Letters Reform Act of 2007, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr3189
300. (last visited May 3, 2013) (indicating that the bill died after referral to committee). The bills' exception to standard procedures for aliens certified as suspected terrorists, § 201(a), was significantly narrower than the emergency exception DHS ultimately adopted.
301. Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, Bos. Globe, Jan. 4, 2006
302. at A1. Editorial, Patriot Act, Part II, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2003, at A16
303. Dan Eggen, 2003 Draft Legislation Covered Eavesdropping, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 2006, at A2
304. CIA Interrogations Report, supra note 56, at 94; September 11 Detainees Report, supra note 76, at 78, 87.
305. Editorial, Vice President for Torture, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 2005, at A18.
306. See Joint Hearing on Arar, supra note 155, at 39, 72-73 (testimony of Scott Hor-ton, Distinguished Visiting Professor, Hofstra Law Sch.).
307. Exigent Letters Report, supra note 102, at 2 (noting participation of the DOJ IG Oversight and Review Division in investigation). For descriptions of the Oversight and Review Division, see Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 2010-September 30, 2010, at 7 (2010); and Bromwich, supra note 31, at 2033-34.
308. Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation's Inspectors General: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 46 (2007) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice) (describing underfund-ing of IGs as the most important challenge to IG effectiveness).
309. T. Christian Miller, The Scrutinizer Finds Himself Under Scrutiny, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 2005
310. 30 (describing allegations that former DOD IG Joseph Schmitz blocked investigations of senior Bush administration officials and noting that Schmitz left his IG role to take a position with a prominent defense contractor).
311. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 913, 956 (2009) (noting lengthy vacancies in statutory IG positions).
312. See Heymann & Kayyem, supra note 12, at 116-17.
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1 (2011).
314. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 113(d)(3) (providing for presidential appointment, but not Senate confirmation, of an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at DHS).
315. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 802, 121 Stat. 266, 358 (2007) (amending Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 222, 6 U.S.C. § 142) (describing civil liberties officers' access to agency information).
316. Garrett Hatch, Cong. Research Serv., RL34385, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status 1-2, 4 (2012);
317. Scott Shane, The Troubled Life of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, N.Y. Times The Caucus (Aug. 9, 2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/the-troubled-life-of-the-privacy-and-civil-liberties-oversight-board.
318. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 894 (2007).
319. Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 106.
320. See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007) (reprinting White House statement of Dec. 17, 2005); U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31 (2006) (statement of Albert Gonzalez, U.S. Att'y Gen.).
321. See Review of the FBI's Investigation of Domestic Advocacy Groups, supra note 229, at 30-31.
322. Memorandum from the Att'y Gen. to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies on Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege 3 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf.
323. Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 84, at 21 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
324. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 301(b)(1), 122 Stat. 2436, 2471-72; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reau-thorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 106A, 119, 120 Stat. 192, 200-02, 219-21 (2006); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. (2011).
325. See, e.g., 154 Cong. Rec. 14,380-82 (2008) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (supporting FISA Amendments Act of 2008); 152 Cong. Rec. 2429 (2006) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) (commenting on IG audit provision in the Patriot Reauthorization Act of 2005).
326. 317.See Review of the FBI's Investigation of Domestic Advocacy Groups, supra note 229, at 66, 177, 186-87.
327. America After 9/11: Freedom Preserved or Freedom Lost?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003)
328. Dan Eggen, Measure Expands Police Powers, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 2004
329. at A1 (describing passage of legislation that partially adopted Patriot Act II proposals).
330. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2012); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 954-55, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2009); Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 75-77 (2d Cir. 2007); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423-24, 429-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 2006 WL 1662663, at *3, *17-19, *35 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 2006 WL 1517743, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2006); United States v. Benatta, 2003 WL 22202371, at *5-6, *10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2003); Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2002).
331. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 577-78, 617 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 879 (2d Cir. 2008).
332. 614 F.3d 1070, 1091 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
333. See, e.g., id. at 1073, 1093
334. 530 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2008)
335. See Heymann & Kayyem, supra note 12, at 109, 114
336. Of course, the effectiveness of congressional involvement may vary according to whether the same political party controls both Congress and the White House.
337. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2330 (2006).
338. On the other hand, in the case studies discussed here, both the highly critical DOJ IG September 11 detainees report and the CIA IG interrogations review were begun and released during periods of "unified" government, raising the possibility that the strength of IG oversight is not as dependent on the presence of "divided" government as other forms of oversight.
339. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 5(c), 92 Stat. 1101, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. (2011) (requiring that semiannual reports be made public).
340. See 50 U.S.C. § 403q(d)(1) (requiring only classified semiannual reports to Congress).
341. See Maher Arar Report, supra note 63, at 35, 38; see also
342. Ellen Nakashima & Carrie Johnson, 'Inappropriate' Secrecy Hurt Surveillance Effort, Report Says, Wash. Post, July 11, 2009
343. at A3 (reporting that former administration officials denied IG interview requests in probe of presidential surveillance program).
344. See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 8E(b)(3)
345. Office of Prof'l Responsibility, Dep't of Justice, Annual Report 2010, at 1 (2010).
346. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 409, 440 (2011).
347. FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case, supra note 224, at 5.
348. generally Project on Gov't Oversight, Inspectors General: Accountability Is a Balancing Act (2009).
349. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 884-885 (1999).
350. Cuéllar, supra note 13, at 289 n.208
351. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3, at 43 (suggesting that IG reports are less constrained than court decisions in affixing blame to individuals because they do not attach monetary sanctions).