Informal risk sharing, index insurance, and risk taking in developing countries

American Economic Review

Volumn 103, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 375-380

  Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq ^a   Rosenzweig, Mark R ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879109315     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.3.375     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (5)

1. Arnott, Richard, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?" American Economic Review 81 (1): 179-90.
2. Jayachandran, Seema. 2006. "Selling Labor Low: Wage Responses to Productivity Shocks in Developing Countries." Journal of Political Economy 114 (3): 538-75.
3. Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfq, and Mark Rosenz-weig. 2012. "Selling Formal Insurance to the Informally Insured." Unpublished.
4. Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfq, and Mark Rosenz-weig. 2013a. "Effects of Informal Risk Sharing and Rainfall Insurance on Risk Choices." Unpublished.
5. Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfq, and Mark Rosenz-weig. 2013b "Labor Market Effects of Selling Rainfall Insurance to Cultivators and Landless Laborers." Unpublished.