Beneath the surface of civil recourse theory

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 527-542

  Chamallas, Martha ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878242430     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U. S. LAW: TORTS 64 (2010).
2. See Anne Bloom with Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 709 (2011) (urging legal actors in torts cases to move away from a narrative of pity and tragedy to one of rights and empowerment).
3. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 980-83 (2010).
4. see generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695 (2003).
5. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
6. See John C. P. Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 329 (2011) (describing torts as "distinctive legal creatures").
7. John C. P. Goldberg, Tort Law at the Founding, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 85, 88 (2011).
8. For a discussion of the importance of "framing" in the development of tort law, see Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809, 818-23 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1345 (2008) (eschewing the importance of formal tort doctrine and using social psychology and the mind sciences to explain the forces that shape contemporary tort law).
10. Two classic articles dissecting the masculine subject of liberal theory from a feminist perspective are Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995)
11. and Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
12. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2, 65 (2005).
13. See Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 874-76 (2008)
14. discussed in MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 307 (3d ed. 2012).
15. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010).
16. John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L. J. 513, 515 (2003) (defining interpretive tort theories).
17. See, e.g., Eric D. Knowles & Peter H. Ditto, Preference, Principle, and Political Casuistry, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 341 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012) (describing how people act inconsistently, unconsciously concealing preference in principle).
18. See Michael Selmi, Comment, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 661 (2003) (footnote omitted); see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 71 (noting that "the interpretive modes are no less value saturated for having eschewed prescription").
19. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007);
20. Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010);
21. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1361-72 (2010) (discussing studies on multiple perspectives).
23. Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky's Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2006) (footnote omitted).
24. See Joanne Conaghan, Tort Law and Feminist Critique, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 175, 208 (2003) (identifying the "discursive convention" of mainstream torts scholarship that accords "an excessive deference to coherence", reinforcing "the conceptual and ideological status quo" (emphasis in original)).
25. I first developed the idea of hidden bias in the deep structures of tort law in Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998). (Pubitemid 128443669)
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 4-6 (2005).
27. See Martha Chamallas with Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 113 (2010).
29. Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in 13 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (Michael Freeman ed., 2011), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1499989.
30. See Prue Vines, Mehera San Roque & Emily Rumble, Is "Nervous Shock" Still a Feminist Issue? The Duty of Care and Psychiatric Injury in Australia, 18 TORT L. REV. 9, 16-18 (2010) (empirical study of Australian tort cases from 1885-2008 revealing a preponderance of female plaintiffs in psychiatric harm cases and concluding that the claim's historical identification with women "reduces its authenticity in the eyes of society and the law").
31. See Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319 (1997);
32. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121 (2001).
33. In U. S. tort law, Leslie Bender has produced the best-known relational feminist scholarship. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988);
34. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L. J. 848 (1990).
35. (citing Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 7, 10 (1989)).
36. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 162 N. E. 99 (N. Y. 1928).
37. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
38. See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007).
39. see also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L. J. 1694, 1736-45 (2008) (discussing three meanings of "dignity").
40. Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1435 (2005).
41. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993) (no personal liability of employees under Title VII).
42. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998).
43. See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
44. 42 U. S. C. § 1981a (b) (3) (2006).
45. Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Explanation of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 39 (2006).
46. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 171-74 (1979) (arguing that harassment claims should be redirected away from "the disabling (and cloying) moralism" of tort law).