Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: A volunteer's dilemma

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 280, Issue 1759, 2013, Pages

  Przepiorka, Wojtek ^a,b   Diekmann, Andreas ^c  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Coordination; Evolution of cooperation; Peer punishment; Second order free rider problem; Social norms; Volunteer's dilemma

Indexed keywords

COEVOLUTION; COEXISTENCE; HETEROGENEITY; SOCIAL NETWORK;

EID: 84878216559     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712954     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2013.0247     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Coleman JS. 1990 Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2. Ostrom E, Walker J, Gardner R. 1992 Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86, 404-417. (doi:10.2307/1964229)
3. Fehr E, Gächter S. 2000 Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 980-994. (doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980)
4. Fehr E, Gächter S. 2002 Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137-140. (doi:10.1038/415137a)
5. Gürerk O, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B. 2006 The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312, 108-111. (doi:10. 1126/science.1123633)
6. Oliver P. 1980 Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: theoretical investigations. Am. J. Soc. 85, 1356-1375. (doi:10. 1086/227168)
7. Yamagishi T. 1986 The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 110-116. (doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110)
8. Heckathorn DD. 1989 Collective action and the second-order free-rider problem. Ration. Soc. 1, 78-100. (doi:10.1177/1043463189001001006)
9. Gintis H. 2000 Strong reciprocity and human sociality. J. Theor. Biol. 206, 169-179. (doi:10. 1006/jtbi.2000.2111)
10. Fehr E, Fischbacher U, Gachter S. 2002 Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Hum. Nat. 13, 1-25. (doi:10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7)
11. Boyd R, Richerson PJ. 1992 Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol. Sociobiol. 13, 171-195. (doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-Y)
12. Boyd R, Gintis H, Bowles S, Richerson PJ. 2003 The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 100, 3531-3535. (doi:10.1073/pnas. 0630443100)
13. Fowler JH. 2005 Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 102, 7047-7049. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0500938102)
14. Hauert C, Traulsen A, Brandt H, Nowak MA, Sigmund K. 2007 Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. Science 316, 1905-1907. (doi:10.1126/science.1141588)
15. Mathew S, Boyd R. 2008 When does optional participation allow the evolution of cooperation? Proc. R. Soc. B 276, 1167-1174. (doi:10.1098/rspb. 2008.1623)
16. Boyd R, Gintis H, Bowles S. 2010 Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science 328, 617-620. (doi:10.1126/science.1183665)
17. Hilbe C, Sigmund K. 2010 Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick. Proc. R. Soc. B 277, 2427-2433. (doi:10.1098/rspb. 2010.0065)
18. Egas M, Riedl A. 2008 The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation. Proc. R. Soc. B 275, 871-878. (doi:10.1098/rspb. 2007.1558)
19. Nikiforakis N, Normann H-T. 2008 A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Exp. Econ. 11, 358-369. (doi:10.1007/ s10683-007-9171-3)
20. Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. 2008 Winners don't punish. Nature 452, 348-351. (doi:10.1038/nature06723)
21. Wu J-J, Zhang B-Y, Zhou Z-X, He Q-Q, Zheng X-D, Cressman R, Taoa Y. 2009 Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 106, 17448-17451. (doi:10.1073/pnas. 0905918106)
22. Gächter S, Renner E, Sefton M. 2008 The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322, 1510-1510. (doi:10.1126/science.1164744)
23. Sääksvuori L, Mappes T, Puurtinen M. 2011 Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict. Proc. R. Soc. B 278, 3428-3436. (doi:10.1098/rspb. 2011.0252)
24. Nikiforakis N. 2008 Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? J. Publ. Econ. 92, 91-112. (doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008)
25. Herrmann B, Thöni C, Gächter S. 2008 Antisocial Punishment Across Societies. Science 319, 1362-1367. (doi:10.1126/science.1153808)
26. Fehl K, Sommerfeld RD, Semmann D, Krambeck H-J, Milinski M. 2012 I dare you to punish me- vendettas in games of cooperation. PLoS ONE 7, e45093. (doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045093)
27. Eldakar OT, Wilson DS. 2008 Selfishness as second-order altruism. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 105, 6982-6986. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0712173105)
28. Gambetta D. 1993 The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
29. Ostrom E. 1990 Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
30. Milgrom PR, North DC, Weingast BR. 1990 The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. Econ. Polit. 2, 1-23. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343. 1990.tb00020.x)
31. Greif A. 1993 Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders' coalition. Am. Econ. Rev. 83, 525-548.
32. Casari M. 2007 Emergence of endogenous legal institutions: property rights and community governance in the Italian Alps. J. Econ. Hist. 67, 191-226. (doi:10.1017/S0022050707000071)
33. Kosfeld M, Okada A, Riedl A. 2009 Institution formation in public goods games. Am. Econ. Rev. 99, 1335-1355. (doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1335)
34. Baldassarri D, Grossman G. 2011 Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 108, 11023-11027. (doi:10.1073/pnas. 1105456108)
35. Traulsen A, Röhl T, Milinski M. 2012 An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons. Proc. R. Soc. B 279, 3716-3721. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.0937)
36. Sigmund K. 2007 Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans. Trends Ecol. Evol. 22593-22600. (doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.06.012)
37. Guala F. 2012 Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behav. Brain Sci. 35, 1-15. (doi:10. 1017/S0140525X11000069)
38. Diekmann A. 1985 Volunteer's dilemma. J. Confl. Resolut. 29, 605-610. (doi:10.1177/ 0022002785029004003)
39. Diekmann A. 1993 Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: theory and experimental evidence. Int. J. Game Theor. 2275-2285. (doi:10.1007/BF01245571)
40. Raihani NJ, Bshary R. 2011 The evolution of punishment in n-player public goods games: a volunteer's dilemma. Evolution 65, 2725-2728. (doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01383.x)
41. Archetti M, Scheuring I. 2011 Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games. Evolution 65, 1140-1148. (doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01185.x)
42. Fischbacher U. 2007 z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp. Econ. 10, 171-178. (doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4)
43. Diekmann A, Przepiorka W. 2012 Take one for the team: inequality and the evolution of norms of cooperation in a volunteer's dilemma. Working paper, ETH Zurich, Chair of Sociology, Zurich, Switzerland.
44. Cisarovsky G, Bshary A, Bouzelboudjen M, Bshary R. 2012 Spatial group structure as potential mechanism to maintain cooperation in fish shoals of unrelated individuals. Ethology 118, 850-857. (doi:10.1111/j.1439-0310.2012.02075.x)
45. O'Gorman R, Henrich J, Van Vugt M. 2009 Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation. Proc. R. Soc. B 276, 323-329. (doi:10. 1098/rspb.2008.1082)
46. Andreoni J, Gee LK. 2012 Gun for hire: delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision. J. Publ. Econ. 96, 1036-1046. (doi:10. 1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003)