Normative Systems: Logic, Probability, and Rational Choice

The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Chater, Nick ^a   Oaksford, Mike ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Consistency; Decision theory; Logic; Normative explanation; Probability; Rational choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877982003     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0002     Document Type: Chapter

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