Quantifying the efficiency of price-only contracts in push supply chains over demand distributions of known supports

Omega (United Kingdom)

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 98-108

  Du, Donglei ^a   Chen, Bo ^b   Xu, Dachuan ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^c BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (China)

Author keywords

Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy; Stackelberg game; Supply chain management

Indexed keywords

COSTS; EFFICIENCY; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

DEMAND DISTRIBUTION; DEMAND UNCERTAINTY; ITS EFFICIENCIES; NASH EQUILIBRIA; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRIOR-KNOWLEDGE; STACKELBERG GAMES; SUPPLY CHAIN CONFIGURATION; SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS;

SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT;

EID: 84877918267     PISSN: 03050483     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2013.03.004     Document Type: Article

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