Aggregate comparative statics

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 27-49

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Jensen, Martin Kaae ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Aggregative games; Comparative statics; Contests; Cournot model; Nice games; Patent races; Public good provision; Strategic substitutes

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877884223     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.009     Document Type: Article

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