Public choice theory and overcriminalization

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 715-793

  Larkin, Paul J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876848859     PISSN: 01934872     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 785, 806 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 545-54 (1960);
3. Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1150-52 (1960)
4. See Marie Gryphon, The Better Part of Lenity, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 717, 717 (2011). Overcriminalization comes in several forms: "(1) untenable offenses; (2)
5. See, e.g., Edwin Meese, III, Big Brother on the Beat: The Expanding Federalization of Crime, 1 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 1 (1997);
6. Edwin Meese, III, Overcriminalization in Practice: Trends and Recent Controversies, 8 Seton Hall Circuit Rev. 505 (2012);
7. Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1279 (2007).
8. See Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims' Rights Movement, 43 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 665, 670 (2000).
9. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985).
10. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169, 178-85 (1968);