Self-enforcing constitutions: With an application to democratic stability in America's first century

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 278-302

  Mittal, Sonia ^a   Weingast, Barry R ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876389153     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewr017     Document Type: Article

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