Davidson was almost right about lying

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 91, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 337-353

  Fallis, Don ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Conceptual Analysis; Donald Davidson; Lying

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876373736     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2012.688980     Document Type: Article

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