Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 326, Issue , 2013, Pages 70-81

  Dercole, Fabio ^a   De Carli, Marco ^a   Della Rossa, Fabio ^a   Papadopoulos, Alessandro V ^a  

^a POLITECNICO DI MILANO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Altruistic punishment; Finite populations; Fixation of cooperation; Public goods games; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH; PUBLIC GOODS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR CONTROL; COOPERATION; ECONOMIC ASPECT; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; PEER PUNISHMENT; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUBLIC GOODS GAME; PUNISHMENT; QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS; SHARED PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL ATTITUDE; SOCIAL CONTROL; SOCIAL INTERACTION; STOCHASTIC MODEL;

ALTRUISM; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PUBLIC RELATIONS; PUNISHMENT; VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS;

EID: 84876109266     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.034     Document Type: Article

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