Extending disorder: Essentialism, family resemblance and secondary sense

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 185-195

  Pickering, Neil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Essentialism; Extension of concepts; Family resemblance; Mental disorder; Secondary sense; Wittgenstein

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876029550     PISSN: 13867423     EISSN: 15728633     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11019-011-9372-6     Document Type: Article

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