Tainted Law

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Volumn 80, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 923-944

  Dorf, Michael C ^a  

^a MIT Sloan School of Management   (United States)

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EID: 84875622986     PISSN: 00096881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (113)

1. See, e.g., Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act (Assault Weapons Ban), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110105, 108 Stat. 1796,2000(1994) (repealed Sept. 13, 2004).
2. See, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §101, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U. S. C.) [hereinafter Estate Tax].
3. See id; see also Peter J. Kosydar, III, "Death and Taxes" or Death Without Taxes, 37 J. LEG. 224,228(2012) (describing the process by which the Estate Tax, after being fully repealed in 2010, was originally scheduled to come back into effect in 2011).
4. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 347 U. S. 483,494-95(1954).
5. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ, 349 U. S. 294,301(1955).
6. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRTNG ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 89 (Benjamin Page, ed., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing the efforts of recalcitrant parties to make use of judicial discretion to limit de-segregation efforts post-Brown II).
7. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U. S. 430,437-38(1968).
8. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ, 402 U. S. 1,15(1971).
9. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. Rev. 945, 953, 954-56, 957, tbl.l (2006) for a discussion of the discrepancy between the levels of explicit, self-reported racial bias and implicit, unconscious bias. While Greenwald and Krieger's data find relatively low rates of explicit bias, they note the pervasiveness of implicit racial biases and discuss how implicit measures of bias have greater predictive validity than expressive measures in situations like racial interactions.
10. See Russell H. Fazio and Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297,305-07(2003) (examining the predictive validity of implicit measures of bias).
11. See, e.g., Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Average mathematics scale scores of 4th-, 8th-, and 12th-graders, by selected student and school characteristics: Selected years, 1990 through 2009, DIG. EDUC. STAT. 2010(2010), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl0/tables/dtl0-146.asp?referrer=report;
12. Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Average reading scale score and standard deviation, by sex, grade, race/ethnicity, and percentile: Selected years, 1992 through 2009, DIG. EDUC. STAT. 2010(2010), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ dl0/tables/dtl0-125.asp?referrer=report;
13. see also Jaekyung Lee, Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gap Trends: Reversing the Progress Towards Equity?, 31 EDUC. RES. 3,3-5(2002) (providing data showing a narrowing of the racial achievement gap in the 1970s and 1980s that was partly reversed in the 1990s).
14. See, e.g., MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH 130-35, (1995);
15. Rakesh Kochhar et al, Twenty-to-One: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs- between-whites-blackshispanics/.
16. See, e.g., Crime in the United States 2009: Expanded Homicide Table 2: Murder Victims by Age, Sex, and Race, 2009, FBI (Sept. 2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/expanded-information/data/shrtable-02. html.
17. See Crime in the United States 2009: Table 43: Arrests by Race, 2009, FBI (Sept. 2010), available at http://www2.foi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table-43.html;
18. see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (adducing evidence for the hypothesis of implicit bias among judges as a reason why black defendants fare worse than similarly situated white defendants).
19. But see Benjamin D. Steiner & Victor Argothy, White Addiction: Racial Inequality, Racial Ideology, and the War on Drugs, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 454-56 & 455 n. 40 (2001) (describing the unreliability of the FBI's Uniform Crime Report and its role in influencing the generally inaccurate public perception that the typical criminal offender is African-American).
20. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ, 402 U. S. 1, 21,28(1971);
21. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U. S. 430,439-41(1968);
22. Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 391 U. S. 450,458-60(1968).
23. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467,495-96(1992);
24. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267,281-82(1977);
25. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424,434-36(1976);
26. Swann, 402 U. S. at 16.
27. See Green, 391 U. S. at 439-41.
28. See Freeman, 503 U. S. at 494-95.
29. Freeman, 503 U. S. at 472;
30. Green, 391 U. S. at 439.
31. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 721,736-37(2007) (striking down a public school pupil assignment system that supplemented parental choice with racial balancing criteria).
32. See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U. S. 218,221(1964) (holding that closing public schools while diverting public funds to segregated private schools denied African American students equal protection);
33. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §4, 120 Stat. 577,580(2006) (codified as amended at 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (8) (2006)).
34. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b to 1973c (2006);
35. C. F. R. § 51. 52 (2011).
36. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,358-60(1966) (Black, J., dissenting);
37. Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 184-85 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992);
38. Michael Halberstam, The Myth of "Conquered Provinces": Probing the Extent of the VRA's Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 923,933-36(2011) (describing the burdens the VRA imposes on covered jurisdictions but nonetheless arguing that these burdens are less intrusive than commonly assumed).
39. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193,201-02(2009).
40. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Redisricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575,1651(2010) (describing the majority opinion's extensive dicta discussing Section 5's potential constitutional "infirmities");
41. Christopher B. Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Need for a Revised Bailout System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9,49-51(2010) (calling the opinion a "time bomb" for the VRA because of its likely constitutional implications);
42. Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO, 61 FLA. L. REV. 991,998(2009) (noting that the opinion adduces numerous reasons for invalidating the VRA before ultimately grounding the decision in statutory construction).
43. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515,531-34(1996);
44. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190,197-99(1976) (finding intermediate scrutiny applicable to sex-based classifications).
45. See The Originalist, Justice Antonin Scalia, CAL. LAWYER, (Jan. 2011) http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid=913358&evid=l;
46. Legally Speaking: Antonin Scalia, UCTV (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.uctv. tv/search-details.aspx?showID=20773 (recording of University of California Television broadcast).
47. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 98,104-05(2000) (describing right to vote as fundamental en route to invalidating court-ordered recount as containing inadequate safeguards for equal treatment of each ballot);
48. Harper, 383 U. S. at 665-67 (1966) (invalidating poll tax as unequal burden on the fundamental right to vote);
49. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,561-62(1964) (invalidating state legislative malapportionment as invidious).
50. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24,55(1974) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to felon disenfranchisement on textual and historical grounds).
51. See Slate Laws Affecting the Voting Rights of People with Disabilities, BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L. (June 16, 2008), http://www.bazelon.org/ LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=lkgFTxMFHZE%3d.
52. See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) (finding a Maine constitutional provision that barred individuals under guardianship from voting violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses on their face and as applied).
53. The Supreme Court cited Doe v. Rowe approvingly in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 525(2004), albeit in an entirely different context (discussing the power of Congress to promulgate Title II of the ADA and access to the courts).
54. For a contrary perspective, see Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 808-10, 810 n. 8 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding laws prohibiting persons under court-ordered guardianship due to mental incapacity from voting did not violate equal protection, although leaving open the possibility that blanket disenfranchisement of the mentally incapacitated might be invalid).
55. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-20,56(1955) (illustrating the debates in the 39th Congress over the Civil Rights Bill). Nineteenth Century legal thinkers also distinguished a third category of social rights, which were sometimes thought to be beyond the reach of the law, as described by the majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson.
56. See 163 U. S. 537,544(1896);
57. see also Michael W. Mcconnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,1016(1995) (describing the tri-partite division of rights into political, civil, and social rights during the Reconstruction era).
58. Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229,1230(2000);
59. see also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) (arguing that the women's suffrage movement that culminated in the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment aimed to perfect the Fourteenth Amendment);
60. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130,141(1873) ("The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.").
61. Expected-application originalism is the version of originalism that generally figures in public debate. See Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011,2022-23(2012) (noting the gap between public debate about originalism and academic theories of originalism). Other versions of originalism are discussed below. See infra, text accompanying notes 46-55.
62. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497,500(1954).
63. Michael C. Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory, 85 GEO. L. J. 1857,1867(1997).
64. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,1806(2005).
65. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410,415-16(1993) (arguing for a justice-seeking account of the Constitution). There may be other nonoriginalist grounds for following the Constitution's text. For example, David Strauss locates the contemporary force of the constitutional text in its ability to provide common ground for people of diverse views. See STRAUSS, supra note 37, at 99-114.
66. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L. J. 1765,1800-22(1997) (explaining how original understanding may be relevant for nonoriginalists);
67. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204,204-05(1980) (distinguishing between "strict" and "moderate" originalism).
68. For examples of the "old" originalism of expected concrete applications, see Raoui Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 350,352(1988) (deriding judicial decisions that "read general words in disregard of the specific intention");
69. Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773,796("[O]riginalist theory simply directs judges to use their best efforts to determine what the intent of the drafters would be in a particular situation. ").
70. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101,105(2001);
71. see also Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 599,607-10(2004) (providing a similar catalogue).
72. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 228 (2011).
73. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L. J. 239,247-62(2009) (describing the evolution of originalism);
74. James E. Fleming, Symposium, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10,11-12(2007) (listing versions of originalism).
75. See Steven G. Calabresi and Julia Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1,46-57(2011) (purporting to apply the favored interpretive methodology of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers to conclude that sex should have been deemed a form of caste by those Framers).
76. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L. J. 713,771-73(2011) (attributing this bait and switch to Justices Scalia and Thomas, among others).
77. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,2751-52(2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
78. (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020,3072(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Justice Scalia has been branded a new originalist for his majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008).
80. See Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 ("Justice Scalia's opinion [in Heller] is the finest example of what is now called 'original public meaning' jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.");
81. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923,940(2009) ("[l]t is hard to imagine finding a clearer example of original public meaning originalism in an actual judicial decision. ").
82. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 609, 610,617(2008) ("Heller shows [that t]he new originalism, like the old, fails to deliver on its claim about eliminating judicial subjectivity, judgment, and choice.").
83. see RETT R. LUDWKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER SOVIET DOMINANCE 73,110(1996).
84. See Rett R. Ludwickowski, A New Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe, in FREEDOM AND CHOICE IN A DEMOCRACY: THE DIFFICULT PASSAGE TO FREEDOM 109,130-34(Robert Magliola & Richard Khuri eds. 2004) (describing the thorough scope of Hungarian constitutional amendments);
85. Wiktor Osiatynski, Poland's Constitutional Ordeal, 3 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 29,29(1994) (describing the evolutionary rather than revolutionary process of constitutional change in both Poland and Hungary).
86. See Andrew Arato, Parliamentary Constitution Making in Hungary, 4 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 45,45-46(1995) (describing some of the political motivations that re-awoke Hungarian desire for constitution making);
87. Andrzej Rzeplinski, The Polish Bill of Rights and Freedoms: A Case Study of Constitution-Making in Poland, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 26,26-27(1993) (examining the then-active provisions of the 1952 Constitution that regulated individual rights in Poland). Hungary adopted a new constitution in 2012, but it appears to be less democratic than the existing one. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary's New Anti-Democratic Constitution (June 27, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
88. See Ziyad Motala, Constitution-Making in Divided Societies and Legitimacy: Lessons from the South African Experience, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 147,151(2005);
89. Richard W. Bauman & David Scheiderman, Introduction: The South African Constitution in Transition, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 1,5-6(1996).
90. See Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse into South Africa's Journey Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463,479-83(1996) (discussing the characteristics of South Africa's interim constitution).
91. Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67,69-74(1999) (discussing the previous constitutions used in South Africa);
92. Heinz Klug, Participating in the Design: Constitution-Making in South Africa, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 18, 39-40) (1996) (describing the drafting process of the South African final Constitution).
93. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 188,192 (Richard Beeman, et al., eds., 1987) (noting that, in addition to numerous clauses that either directly or indirectly protected slavery, "the structure of the Constitution ensured against emancipation by the new federal government.");
94. James Oakes, Bondage, Freedom, and the Constitution: The New Slavery Scholarship and its Impact on Law and Legal Historiography: Slavery and the Constitution: "The Compromising Expedient", Justifying a Proslavery Constitution, 17
95. CARDOZO L. REV. 2023,2047-48(1996) (explaining that even anti-slavery supporters of the Constitution understood that it left the legality of slavery to the states);
96. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 69 (1996) (recounting speech by James Madison at the Constitutional Convention in which Madison cast the core axis of difference among the states as running between slave and free, rather than large and small).
97. See Garrett Epps, Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don' Is and Three Dos, 16 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 433,450(2007) (describing the broad goals of framers of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. Professor Epps criticizes the modern Supreme Court for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as leaving the basic structures of federalism in place, see id. at 450-51 (critiquing United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000)), and rightly so. However, even the broadest reading of the Fourteenth Amendment would not alter the system of state representation in the Senate, the Presidential veto, or the Electoral College. Thus, even read for all they are worth, the Reconstruction Amendments fall short of "systematic remediation. "
99. See Danny Yadron, House Reads Constitution, Gets Civics Lesson, WASHINGTON WIRE (Jan. 6, 2011, 2:05 PM), available at http:/blogs.wsj.com/ washwire/2011/01/06/house-reads-constitutiongets-civics-lesson/.
100. Chris Good, Should Congress Have Read the WHOLE Constitution? Jesse Jackson, Jr. Makes the Case, ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.meatlamic.com/ politics/archive/2011/01/shouldcongress-have-read-the-whole-constitution-jesse- jackson-jr-makes-the-case/68983/.
101. LINDSAY SWIFT, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 307 (1911).
102. See, e.g., Thomas Roderick Dew, Abolition of Negro Slavery, in THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY 23,40-41(Drew Giplin Faust, ed. 1981);
103. Thorton Stringfellow, A Brief Examination of Scripture Testimony on the Institution of Slavery, in THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY 138,149-50(Drew Giplin Faust, ed. 1981);
104. see also THE CONSTITUTION A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT 8-9 (3d ed. New York, American Anti-Slavery Society 1856).
105. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat) 543, 584-85,587-89(1823) (finding that the rights of Native American tribes to claim a valid title to land subject to the power of the "conquering nation"-the United States);
106. TLM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS, 131, 141,210-15(Paperback ed. 2009) (illustrating Southern arguments against tribal sovereignty based on states-rights interpretations of the Constitution);
107. REG. DEB. 999 (1830) (debating the removal of Native Americans and the power of the Executive to ignore treaties made with tribes).
108. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537,561(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the "Chinese race" as "so different from our own" as to warrant ineligibility for citizenship);
109. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214,217-20(1944);
110. See Office of Public Affairs, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act, Dep't JUSTICE (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/ll-ag-222.html;
111. CONG. REC. S10100,10101(1996) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott) ("The same article of the Constitution that calls for "full faith and credit" for State court decisions also gives Congress the power to decide how that provision will be implemented.... Those words make clear what the Framers of the Constitution intended. None of them, I don't think, could have foreseen the day when an American court would sanction same-sex marriages or unions, but they wisely provided for the possibility that some State court might do something like that someday-");
112. Cong Rec H 7480,7486(1996) (statement of Rep. Steve Buyer) ("When one State wants to move towards the recognition of same-sex marriages, it is wrong. The full faith and credit of the Constitution would force States like Indiana to abide by it. We as a Federal Government have a responsibility to act, and we will act.");
113. see also Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409 (1998-1999) (arguing that DOMA does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause).