Proved generation of implementations from computationally secure protocol specifications

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 7796 LNCS, Issue , 2013, Pages 63-82

  Cadé, David ^a   Blanchet, Bruno ^a  

^a INRIA ROCQUENCOURT   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL MODEL; COMPUTATIONAL PROTOCOLS; PROBABILITY P; PROTOCOL SPECIFICATIONS; SECURE PROTOCOLS; SECURITY PROPERTIES; SECURITY PROTOCOLS;

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; NETWORK SECURITY; PROGRAM COMPILERS;

SPECIFICATIONS;

EID: 84874422917     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36830-1_4     Document Type: Conference Paper

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