Public choice: An introduction

Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 31-46

  Mueller, Dennis C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84874201313     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_2     Document Type: Chapter

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