Conditions making for success and failure of denial and deception: Nonstate and illicit actors

Trends in Organized Crime

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 32-58

  Bell, J Bowyer ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84873562099     PISSN: 10844791     EISSN: 19364830     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12117-000-1004-0     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Denial focuses primarily on hiding the real by masking, repackaging or, if all else fails, by dazzling. See J. Barton Bowyer (Pseudo. J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley), Cheating: Deception in War & Magic, Games & Sports, Sex & Religion, Business & Con Games, Politics & Espionage, Art & Science (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 49-50.
2. The literature on the American Cosa Nostra is extensive, but there is little that focuses on the theory of deception or denial. In law enforcement books such as those on the Pizza Connection or the Gambino family the authors are apt to give in detail the obstacles to penetration--denial as practiced without theory--that indicate ingenuity, innocence, and the application of technical means.
3. See, for example, Ralph Blumenthal, Last Days of the Sicilians (New York: New York Times Books, 1988).
4. Joseph F. O'Brien and Andris Kurins, Boss of Bosses, The Fall of the Godfather: The FBI and Paul Castellano (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).
5. For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the revolutionary underground, see J. Bowyer Bell, The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle (London: Frank Cass, 1998); for the feel of the underground almost any of the more famous diaries or journals will do.
6. See Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Bolivian Diary (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968).
7. Menachem Begin, The Revolt (Los Angeles, CA: Nash, 1972).
8. Most analysis of the PLO and A1-Fatah note that Black September was "secretly" a part of A1-Fatah, but not as a result of deception planning.
9. Grivas shaped his revolt very much as an army officer and, like many army officers, wrote memoirs and histories adjusted in recollection. But, the deception planning he undertook arose from his reading of the necessities of Cypriot Greek politics. Thus, he presumed that his view into the future was simply more penetrating than that of his political allies or the Greek Cypriots.
10. See General George Grivas, The Memoirs of General Grivas (London: Longmans, 1964), a shortened version of his initial Greek edition.
11. There is a library filled with books on how to be a guerrilla and nothing for the would-be gunman. Carlos Marighella wrote a mini-manual, but he was killed during his struggle; and Abraham Guillén's Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1973) is hardly an action manual. Most gunmen learn on the job in any case.
12. There is not yet a book on the intrusion of the Islamic fundamentalist into New York, and so the major sources remain the media. For more about violent Islamic fundamentalism, an excellent early analysis is Gilles Kepel, Le Prophéte et Pharaon: Les Mouvements lslamistes dans l'Egypte Contemporaine (Paris, FR: Editions La Découverte, 1984).
13. The best account of this meeting can be found in Claire Sterling, Octopus, The Long Reach of the International Mafia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).