Complex dynamics in learning complicated games

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 110, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 1232-1236

  Galla, Tobias ^a   Farmer, J Doyne ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHM; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; CHAOTIC DYNAMICS; CRITERION VARIABLE; DECISION MAKING; DYNAMICS; EXPERIENCE WEIGHTED ATTRACTION; FEMALE; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; MACHINE LEARNING; MALE; MEMORY; PARAMETERS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REINFORCEMENT; SIMULATION; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

EID: 84872864624     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1109672110     Document Type: Article

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