When does a firm disclose product information?

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 630-649

  Koessler, Frédéric ^a   Renault, Régis ^b  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UMR 8184   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872844230     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12002     Document Type: Article

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