Negative causation in causal and mechanistic explanation

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 449-469

  Barros, D Benjamin ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b WIDENER UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Causation; Explanation; Mechanisms; Natural selection; Omissions; Preventions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872500753     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0040-4     Document Type: Article

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