Prosecutorial decriminalization

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Volumn 102, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 785-820

  Luna, Erik ^a  

^a WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84872084894     PISSN: 00914169     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (292)

1. Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962).
2. Id. at 910.
3. At the turn of the previous century, Roscoe Pound noted "the crude and unorganized character of American legislation in a period when the growing point of law has drifted to legislation."
4. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906).
5. He would later point out that, "of one hundred thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 1912, more than one half were held for violation of legal precepts which did not exist twenty-five years before."
6. Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice In America 23 (1930).
7. Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice, 32 SOC. SERV. REV. 107, 108 (1958).
8. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From "Over criminalization" to "Smart on Crime": American Criminal Justice Reform-Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 597 (2011).
9. Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 432 (1963) [hereinafter Kadish, Some Observations]
10. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Over criminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 158 (1967) [hereinafter Kadish, Crisis of Overcriminalization]
11. NORVAL MORRIS & GORDON HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970)
12. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 250-366 (1969)
13. Frank J. Remington, The Limits and Possibilities of the Criminal Law, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865, 865 (1968).
14. Kadish, Crisis of Over criminalization, supra note 6, at 163-65.
15. Kadish, Some Observations, supra note 6, at 436.
16. Id. at 425-26.
17. Kadish, Crisis of Over criminalization, supra note 6, at 158.
18. Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Over federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1249 (1995) [hereinafter Kadish, Folly of Overfederalization]
19. Sanford H. Kadish, More on Over criminalization: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 UCLA L. REV. 719, 719 (1972).
20. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Ensnared, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A1
21. Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join to Take On U.S. in Criminal Justice Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at A1.
22. Reining in Over criminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before the Sub comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm.
23. th Cong. (2010); GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2004); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE "THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW" (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009); Symposium, Overcriminalization 2.0: Developing Consensus Solutions, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 565 (2011); Symposium, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005).
24. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704-717 (2005) [hereinafter Over criminalization Phenomenon].
25. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 582-587 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological Politics].
26. Stuntz was not advocating the depoliticization approach. Indeed, he suggests that "expert-driven criminal law is a practical impossibility." Id. at 585.
27. id. at 587-98
28. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 31-38 (1996)
29. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 530-570 (2004)
30. Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 358-393 (2000).
31. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 838-843 (2006) [hereinafter Political Constitution].
32. Ronald Dworkin, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16-17, 34-35 (1996)
33. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 824 (1999).
34. Kadish L, Folly of Overfederalization, supra note 11, at 1248-49.
35. Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 783 (2012).
36. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 110 (1999)
37. Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 81-86 (2009).
38. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 15, at 510
39. Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 17, at 846.
40. Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES ch. 2 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing limits on federal judicial power).
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905)
42. Robert C. Post, Lecture, Defending the Life world: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (1998).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
44. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
45. Molly M. Gill, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of Mandatory Minimums, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 55, 55 (2008).
46. National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009, S. 714, 111th Cong. § 4.
47. Letter from S. 714 Coalition Supporters to Senator Jim Webb (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38089190/S-714-Coalition-Supporters.
48. Luna, Over criminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 730-31.
49. Legislative Update, OVERCRIMINALIZED.COM, http://overcriminalized.com/Legislation.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (describing a Heritage Foundation project providing "details, status, and basic commentary on legislation pending in Congress that could perpetuate the dangerous trend of criminalizing more and more conduct that is socially and economically beneficial and of punishing Americans for acts they commit without criminal intent").
50. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
51. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2000)
52. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
53. James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 654.
54. Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960)
55. Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 642 (1983).
56. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977).
57. Except, as mentioned previously, when a statute touches on topics such as speech and procreation. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
58. Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1418,15-16 (2010).
59. Id. at 1418 n.17.
60. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
61. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
62. See Luna & Wade, supra note 38, at 1418 n.18.
63. Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 10 (1997).
64. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 474-475 (1996)
65. Kahan, supra note 43, at 9-11.
66. John S. Baker, Jr., HERITAGE FOUND., REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/lm26.pdf.
67. Actually, the number is probably much larger, due to the thousands of regulations that do not appear in federal statutes yet carry the possibility of criminal penalties.
68. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Code Is Overgrown, Legal Experts Tell Panel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2011, at A8 (quoting former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese)
69. Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation's Federal Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A10. Apparently, the Congressional Research Service gave up an attempt to calculate the amount of separate federal crimes on the books. Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 26, 28. The Justice Department has acknowledged that the number cannot be quantified. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 12 (citing Justice Department spokeswoman).
70. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 n.9 (1998) (revealing "startling fact" that "[m]ore than 40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970," and noting that "[m]uch, though not all, of this surge has occurred in the last two decades").
71. United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1090-1103 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding, inter alia, a federal felony indictment for violation of Utah's commercial bribery statute, a misdemeanor under state law).
72. Paul Rosenzweig, Heritage Found., The Over-Criminalization Of Social And Economic Conduct (2003), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2003/pdf/lm7.pdf.
73. Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 709-10. But see Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (limiting the scope of "honest services" fraud).
74. As compared to the federal government, the states at least possess a constitutionally legitimate police power. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995).
75. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 172 (2003)
76. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635-38 (2005)
77. Professor Stuntz made similar findings with regard to the criminal codes of Massachusetts and Virginia. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 15, at 514.
78. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 227-28 (2007).
79. Robinson & Cahill, supra note 51, at 634.
80. Luna, Over criminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 746 (referring to GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 15).
81. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 15, at 511.
82. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940).
83. Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You're (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 44;
84. Michelle Alexander, I'm a Criminal and So Are You, CNN.COM (May 18, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-18/opinion/alexander.who.am.i_1_law-abid ing-felons-criminal?_s=PM:OPINION.
85. Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Preface, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE at xi, xi (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012).
86. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 270-74 (2011)
87. Wayne R. Lafave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 1.10(c) (3d ed. & Supp. 2011).
88. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 143-145 (2011) (questioning prosecutorial caseload numbers).
89. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 75 (2002).
90. The declination rate varies widely across jurisdictions and among crime categories; to the extent the information is made public, the reasons for declining cases vary widely as well.
91. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1717-20 (2010)
92. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 130-31 (2008)
93. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2004)
94. Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 252 (2003)
95. Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758 (2003).
96. Lafave Et AL., supra note 58, at § 13.1(d).
97. Sean Rosenmerkel, et al., Bureau Of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences In State Courts, 2006-Statistical Table S (2009), available at http:bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf;
98. U.S. Dep't Of Justice, Sourcebook Of Criminal Justice Statistics Online tbl.5.35.2009 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5352009.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2012);
99. Bureau Of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't Of Justice, Compendium Of Federal Justice Statistics 67 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf.
100. Wright & Miller, supra note 59, at 153.
101. Decriminalize Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/decriminalize (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
102. Steve Bogira, Courtroom 302: A Year Behind The Scenes In An American Criminal Courthouse 38, 83 (2005).
103. Allison O. Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1594 (2011).
104. Even unelected chief prosecutors (e.g., U.S. Attorneys) are answerable to an executive officer who is subject to the ballot box (e.g., the President).
105. Carl F. Pinkele, Discretion Fits Democracy: An Advocate's Argument, In DISCRETION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Carl F. Pinkele & William C. Louthan eds., 1985).
106. The rule of law is an endlessly contested idea, one that philosophers and legal scholars alike describe as "promiscuous" in its use.
107. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 211 (1979),
108. "one of the most elusive concepts in the lexicon of jurisprudence,"
109. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Introduction: Prospects for the Rule of Law, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 427, 428 (1991),
110. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997)
111. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality Of Law 42 (1969).
112. Erik Luna, Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good Governance, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 583-595 (2004) (offering a detailed discussion of the rule of law).
113. FULLER, supra note 69, at 39; see also Fallon, supra note 68, at 8-9 n.27 (offering similar elements for the rule of law and stating that they are consistent with Fuller's criteria).
114. FULLER, supra note 69, at 39.
115. Id.
116. John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-Mc Cleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1779 (1998).
117. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757 (1998).
118. Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 531, 536 (1997)
119. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1022, 1025 (1988).
120. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)
121. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
122. Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 723-24; Stuntz, supra note 15, at 519-20, 531.
123. As a former Justice Department official noted, "it is not surprising that the federal agency charged with preventing, solving, and punishing federal crimes is not aggressively attempting to shrink the federal code."
124. Rachel Brand, Heritage Found Making It A Federal Case: An Inside View Of The Pressures To Federalize Crime 1-2 (2008)
125. United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004).
126. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984)
127. Employing the term "acoustic separation" to the distinction between conduct rules and decisions rules in crimin al law);
128. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (same for criminal procedure).
129. In some contexts, people might even favor a scheme of low-visibility decision making in criminal justice. With regard to sentencing reform, for instance, Stephen Schulhofer once asked whether it is "inevitably wise to expose the problems and demand a political solution when the questions mix value-laden elements with empirical assessments that the public is unlikely to appreciate; when public opinion in any event is volatile, unformed, or ill-informed; when the issues are emotionally charged and socially divisive?"
130. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 801-02 (1980).
131. In the end, Professor Schulhofer concluded that the force of these arguments "seems to me insufficient to override the traditional virtues of exposure and accountability in the context of the current debate over sentencing reform," although he found "it unnecessary to consider the more elusive question whether low visibility techniques, even if attractive on tactical grounds, are consistent with accepted principles of democratic government." Id. at 803, 806.
132. Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 176-179.
133. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2005).
134. Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Looking Back and at the Challenges Ahead, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 434.
135. The practice also has an uncomfortable resemblance to the enforcement of England's "bloody code" of the eighteenth century and the doctrine of crime by "analogy" in communist dictatorships, both of which sought to cow the masses into conformity.
136. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (Allen Lane ed., 1975)
137. Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145, 208-210 (1993).
138. Then again, some people may prefer to adopt a "sausage theory" of criminal justice: they don't want to know how law enforcement is using its discretion-how the sausage is made, so to speak-they just want low crime and safe streets.
139. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime And Punishment In American History 362-63 (1993).
140. Frank J. Remington, The Future of the Substantive Criminal Law Codification Movement-Theoretical and Practical Concerns, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 867, 893 (1988).
141. Id. at 893-94.
142. William Bender, D.A.: Philly's New Pot Policy Just Makes Sense... and Saves Dollars, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 8, 2011, at 6
143. Craig R. McCoy, Nancy Phillips & Dylan Purcell, Philadelphia Plans Fines for Use of Marijuana, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 5, 2010, at A1
144. Peter Mucha, Marijuana Leniency Starts Today, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 8, 2010), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/courts-refor m/20100608_Marijuana_leniency_starts_today.html.
145. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-104(1)(vii) (2003); 204 PA. CODE § 303.15 (2008).
146. Bender, supra note 87.
147. Letters: Municipal Court Played a Big Role in Small Amount of Marijuana Program, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 3, 2011, at 18; McCoy et al., supra note 87.
148. For instance, an investigative report had found that almost two-thirds of defendants in Philadelphia charged with violent crimes avoided conviction on all charges.
149. Craig R. McCoy, Nancy Phillips & Dylan Purcell, Justice: Delayed, Dismissed, Denied, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 2009, at A1.
150. McCoy et al., supra note 87 (noting this claim, given "Philadelphia police data show" that "[m]ore than 80 percent typically have been of African Americans").
151. Bender, supra note 87.
152. Emily Heffter, Seattle's New City Attorney to Dismiss Cases of Pot Possession, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010808085_marijuana16m. html
153. Pete Holmes, Washington State Should Lead on Marijuana Legalization, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2014247491_guest17holmes.h tml
154. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.92.030, 69.50.4014 (2011).
155. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (1998).
156. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003). Although his punishment was subsequently reduced, one defendant received a life sentence for stealing a piece of pizza.
157. Jack Leonard, "Pizza Thief" Walks the Line, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A1.
158. L.A. COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, THREE STRIKES POLICY: SPECIAL DIRECTIVE (Dec. 19, 2000), http://da.co.la.ca.us/3strikes.htm [hereinafter L.A. THREE STRIKES POLICY]; see also Mandatory Sentencing in California: Cooley's Law, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 24.
159. L.A. THREE STRIKES POLICY, supra note 98.
160. id.
161. Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers' Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 557 (2010);
162. Elizabeth M. Ryan, Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of Indiscretion from Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 357, 360 (2010)
163. JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers' Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 952 (2011).
164. Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 505, 513 (2008).
165. Mathias H. Heck, Sexting and Charging Juveniles?: Balancing the Law and Bad Choices, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Mar. 2009, at 29.
166. id.
167. For instance, in the federal system, overt prosecutorial decriminalization might be seen as violating the President's responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
168. Kevin S. Marshall, Free Enterprise and the Rule of Law: The Political Economy of Executive Discretion (Efficiency Implications of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 239 n.11 (2010)
169. To be sure, executive officials may have no authority to refuse to perform "ministerial" duties mandated by legislation. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 595 (1838).
170. Louis Fisher, Signing Statements: Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183, 184-86 (2007).
171. But faithful execution of criminal law should not be confused with the idea of full enforcement, that is, officials must investigate all known or knowable offenses within their jurisdiction and then prosecute them to the maximum extent allowed by law. This notion has long been recognized to be a myth-one which has only become more ridiculous with each new act of over criminalization.
172. Kadish, supra note 1, at 907; see also DAVIS, supra note 34, at 165.
173. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
174. Mucha, supra note 87; see also McCoy et al., supra note 87.
175. McCoy et al., supra note 87 (quoting police spokesman).
176. Michael Romano, Divining the Spirit of California's Three Strikes Law, 22 FED. SENT'G REP. 171, 173 (2010).
177. Michael Romano, Striking Back: Using Death Penalty Cases to Fight Disproportionate Sentences Imposed Under California's Three Strikes Law, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 311, 330 n.88 (2010).
178. Romano, supra note 109, at 173. As this article was going to press, California voters adopted a ballot initiative modifying the state's three strikes law to require a life sentence only when a defendant's current conviction is for a violent or serious offense. The change also authorizes resentencing for inmates currently serving life sentences if their third strike conviction was not for a serious or violent offense.
179. Marisa Lagos & Ellen Huet, 'Three strikes' law changes approved by wide margin, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2012, at A14.
180. John Hoeffel, D.A. Chides L.A. Council, Says He'll Target Pot Stores, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A1.
181. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 19, at 16-17 (2010), available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/english/19-arg-rebuttals.pdf.
182. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1510 (1987).
183. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
184. Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 202 (2011).
185. Fernando Molina, A Comparison Between Continental European and Anglo-American Approaches to Over criminalization and Some Remarks on How to Deal with It, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 123, 127 (2011).
186. Dean Molina states: When I received the invitation to participate in a symposium about overcriminalization, my first thought was that this presented me with an excellent opportunity to share, with foreign colleagues, concerns about a common problem. However, after reading a provocative article by Erik Luna about the overcriminalization phenomenon.
187. Especially his amazing catalogue of actions that are considered criminal in the United States, I began to doubt whether, despite talking about the same topic, we are really talking about the same problem.... After reading Douglas Husak's book on overcriminalization in Anglo-American law, the suspicions that Luna's article aroused in me were confirmed. Undoubtedly, most of the overcriminalization questions that arise in the United States are completely unknown to us. They are not a cause of concern to us not because we haven't thought about them, but because we have already solved those problems.
188. Id. at 123-24. But cf.
189. Volker Krey & Oliver Windgätter, Rechtspolitisches F. The Untenable Situation Of German Criminal Law: Against Quantitative Overloading, Qualitative Overcharging And The Overexpansion Of Criminal Justice 58 (2012).
190. Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 374 (1977)
191. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 543 (1990)
192. Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 317 (1995)
193. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Lessons of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 15 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 348 (1966).
194. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Denial Of Justice (1977)
195. John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (1974).
196. Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J 240 (1977)
197. John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J 1549 (1978).
198. Jörg-Martin Jehle & Marianne Wade, Coping With Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise Of Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (2005)
199. THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57; Luna & Wade, supra note 38, at 1428.
200. Peter J.P. Tak, The Dutch Prosecutor: A Prosecuting and Sentencing Officer, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 135, 135-136.
201. Chris Lewis, The Evolving Role of the English Crown Prosecution Service, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 214
202. Luna & Wade, supra note 57, at 439.
203. Tak, supra note 121, at 139, 144-46.
204. Opium Act (Opiumwet), Stb. 1976, art. 2, available at http://www.cannabisbureau.nl/en/doc/pdf/Dutch%20Opium_Act_30556.pdf; see also Why Are Coffee Shops Allowed?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/why_ar e_coffee_shops/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) (noting that "possession and sale of small quantities of cannabis in coffee shops are offences under the Opium Act").
205. What Are the Rules Governing Coffee Shops, and How Are They Enforced?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/what_a re_the_rules/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Rules Governing Coffee Shops]
206. Robert J. MacCoun, What Can We Learn From the Dutch Cannabis Coffee shop System?, 106 ADDICTION 1899, 1900 (2011)
207. NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., FAQ DRUGS: A GUIDE TO DUTCH POLICY (2008), available at http://www.minbuza.nl/en/appendices/you-and-the-netherlands/about-the-ne therlands/ethical-issues/faq-drugs.html; Frequently Asked Questions About the Dutch Drugs Policy, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/frequently_asked/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
208. What Are the Main Features of Dutch Policy on Law Enforcement?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/what_a re_the_main/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
209. Rules Governing Coffee Shops, supra note 125.
210. Id.
211. id.; Do Different Municipalities Apply Different Rules?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/do_dif ferent/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); Why Are Fewer Coffee Shops Operating?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/why_ar e_fewer_coffee/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
212. For an in-depth discussion of the Crown Prosecution Service, see Lewis, supra note 122.
213. Suicide Act, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, §§ 1, 2 (1961) (Eng. & Wales).
214. Colin Fernandez, Devoted Mother Kay Gilderdale Charged with Attempted Murder of Paralysed Daughter Who Was Bed-Riden for 17 Years, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (U.K.) (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1170522/Kay-Gilderdale-charged-a ttempted-murder-paralysed-daughter.html.
215. Alison Langley, 'Suicide Tourists' Go to the Swiss for Help in Dying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at A3.
216. More Britons Seeking Suicide Help, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7732640.stm.
217. R. (Purdy) v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [2010] 1 A.C. 345 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
218. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
219. See Purdy, [2010] 1 A.C., at 41 (Lord Hope).
220. Id. at 40.
221. Id. at 30-31.
222. Id. at 55; see also id. at 16 (Lord Phillips), 64 (Baroness Hale), 84-86 (Lord Brown), 99-102 (Lord Neuberger).
223. DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ENCOURAGING OR ASSISTING SUICIDE (2010), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.p df; Note.
224. DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2009) [hereinafter INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS], available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_consultation.pdf; DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., PUBLIC CONSULTATION EXERCISE ON THE INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2010), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_responses.pdf.
225. However, it has been argued that the guidelines still have not produced sufficient legal clarity. See, e.g., COMM'N ON ASSISTED DYING, FINAL REPORT: THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF ASSISTED DYING IS INADEQUATE & INCOHERENT 23 (2011), available at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/476_CoAD_FinalReport_158x240_I_web_single-N EW_.pdf?1328113363.
226. DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 140, at 6.
227. J.R. Spencer, Assisted Suicide and the Discretion to Prosecute, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 493, 495 (2009).
228. COMM'N ON ASSISTED DYING, supra note 140, at 299 (noting that "[t]here is now a broad public perception that assisted suicides that meet the criteria stipulated in the DPP policy are effectively decriminalised").
229. Lewis, supra note 122, at 220.
230. Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125, 1126 (2000).
231. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
232. Lewis, supra note 122, at 224;
233. DPP's Introductory Remarks on Assisted Suicide Policy, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/dpps_introductory_remarks_on_assiste d_suicide_policy/.
234. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
235. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (2006)
236. Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 590-623 (2000).
237. The issue is sufficiently clear to me from my own worldview, which holds that the fundamental unit of moral analysis is the individual, who possesses a right of self-ownership and the freedom to engage generally in capitalist acts with other consenting adults.
238. Luna, Over criminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 732-39.
239. But I recognize that many (perhaps most) Americans will disagree with this philosophy or its applications.
240. For example, the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Cato Institute, the Federalist Society, the Heritage Foundation, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Washington Legal Foundation. See Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 12, at A10; Liptak, supra note 12, at A1.
241. Alexandre Padilla, How Do We Think About Insider Trading? An Economist's Perspective on the Insider Trading Debate and Its Impact, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 239, 240 (2008).
242. Kadish, Crisis of Over criminalization, supra note 6, at 162-163.
243. I take no position here on this controversy.
244. Lewis, supra note 122, at 224.
245. Compare John Finnis, The Lords' Eerie Swansong: A Note on R (Purdy) v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Oxford, Legal Research Paper No. 31/2009 & Notre Dame Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-39, 2009)
246. Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Suicide, and Determination, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 13-19 (2010).
247. Kate Greasley, R(Purdy) v DPP and the Case for Wil ful Blindness, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 301, 323-24 (2010).
248. Erhard Blankenburg, Beleid-A Very Dutch Legal Term, 41 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 65, 67-70 (1998).
249. The Dutch Cabinet: Coffeeshop to Be a Private Club for the Local Market, MINISTRY OF SEC. AND JUSTICE (May 27, 2011), http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/press-releases/2011/ 05/27/the-dutch-cabinet-coffeeshop-to-be-a-private-club-for-the-local-ma rket.html.
250. David Jolly, Hague Court Clears Way for Dutch to Bar Nonresidents From Buying Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2012, at A4.
251. Discussing court ruling upholding new policy, which took effect in the southern provinces on May 1, 2012, and will apply to the entire nation in 2013.
252. MacCoun, supra note 125, at 1900 (footnote omitted).
253. id.
254. Blankenburg, supra note 158, at 66.
255. Id. at 70.
256. id. at 72.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citation omitted).
259. See, e.g., Galina Vromen, A Habit Steeped in History, REUTERS, May 30, 1991, available at http://1.next.westlaw.com (in Reuters News database, enter search: advanced:TI("habit steeped in history")) (discussing Dutch "open curtain culture").
260. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 756-57 (1979).
261. Id. at 755-56.
262. Ellen S. Podgor, Pro secustion Guidelines in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 16-18;
263. Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice," 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 177-85 (2004)
264. Podgor, Balancing "Discretionary Justice," supra note 170, at 199-200.
265. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (quoting government brief). With good reason, the Court rejected this argument.
266. 17318 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, PROCON.ORG (Nov. 16, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
267. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B), (c) (2006).
268. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (rejecting necessity defense for medical marijuana); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge).
269. Michael Vitiello, Legalizing Marijuana: California's Pot of Gold?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1349, 1359-60.
270. Stephen Dinan & Ben Conery, Bush Holdovers at DEA Continue Pot Raids: Obama Vowed to End Policy, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A1.
271. Trip Jennings, Don't Expect DEA Raids on N.M. Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, N.M. INDEP. (June 5, 2009), http://newmexicoindependent.com/28991/dont-expect-dea-raids-on-nm-medica l-marijuana-dispensaries.
272. Josh Meyer & Scott Glover, U.S. Won't Prosecute Medical Pot Sales, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A1;
273. Chris Roberts, Blowing Smoke: Obama Promises One Thing, Does Another on Medical Marijuana, S.F. WEEKLY (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.sfweekly.com/2011-04-06/news/medical-marijuana-raids-obama-er ic-holder-legalization-dispensaries-chris-roberts/.
274. Memorandum from David Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Selected U.S. Att'ys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana 1 (Oct. 19, 2009).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Roberts, supra note 178.
278. Amanda Bronstad, Feds Continue Crackdown Against Medical Pot Stores, RECORDER, Jan. 23, 2012, at 3
279. Erik Eckholm, Medical Marijuana Industry Is Unnerved by U.S. Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at A22.
280. John Ingold, Feds Justify Dispensary Crackdown, DENVER POST, Jan. 20, 2012, at 1B
281. Jennifer Medina, U.S. Attorneys in California Set Crackdown on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at A10; Roberts, supra note 178.
282. William Yardley, New Federal Crackdown Confounds States That Allow Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2011, at 13.
283. Letter from Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Att'y, W.D.& Michael C. Ormsby, U.S. Att'y, E.D. Wash., to Wash. Gov. Christine Gregoire, Re: Medical Marijuana Legislative Proposals 1 (Apr. 14, 2011).
284. Id. at 2.
285. Montana Caregivers Ass'n v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1149 (D. Mont. 2012); see also United States v. Washington, No. CR 11-61-M-DLC, 2012 WL 3610252, at*8-18 (D. Mont. Aug. 22, 2012) (rejecting estoppel claim); Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1111-12 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (same); Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana v. Holder, No. C 11-05349 SBA, 2011 WL 5914031, at *7-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011) (same); United States v. Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1077-82 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (same); cf. United States v. Williams, No. CR 12-08-H-DLC, 2012 WL 3963323, at*1-3 (D. Mont. Sept. 11, 2012) (rejecting Guarantee Clause challenge).
286. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Att'ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use, 1-2 (June 29, 2011); see also Montana Caregivers, 2012 WL 169771, at*2 n.1.
287. Benjamin B. Wagner & Jared C. Dolan, Medical Marijuana and Federal Narcotics Enforcement in the Eastern District of California, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 109, 115-17 (2012).
288. Roberts, supra note 178;
289. Jacob Sullum, Read My Tea Leaves, REASON.COM (Oct. 12, 2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/10/12/read-my-tea-leaves.
290. Robert Weisberg has suggested that California's Proposition 215, which would have legalized non-medical marijuana, might have been "so direct an insult to the federal prohibition [scheme]," that law enforcement had to "at least threaten[] a much tougher enforcement policy." Note.
291. Robert Weisberg, Approaches to Assessing the Effects of Marijuana Criminal Law Repeal in California, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 7 (2012).
292. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent