How to compute in the presence of leakage

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 31-40

  Goldwasser, Shafi ^a   Rothblum, Guy N ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BLACK BOXES; CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS; EQUIVALENT ALGORITHM; FOLLOWING PROBLEM; HARDWARE COMPONENTS; INPUT-OUTPUT BEHAVIOR; INPUT/OUTPUT BEHAVIORS; INTERNAL STATE; PARTIAL INFORMATION; RUNNING TIME; SEARCH ALGORITHMS; SECURITY PARAMETERS; SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK;

COMPUTER SCIENCE; CRYPTOGRAPHY;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84871955532     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2012.34     Document Type: Conference Paper

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