Steps to reduce favorable risk selection in medicare advantage largely succeeded, boding well for health insurance exchanges

Health Affairs

Volumn 31, Issue 12, 2012, Pages 2618-2628

  Newhouse, Joseph P ^a   Price, Mary ^b   Huang, Jie ^b   Michael McWilliams, J ^c,d   Hsu, John ^c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DIVISION OF RESEARCH   (United States)

^c HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL   (United States)

^d MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACT; ARTICLE; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH INSURANCE; HUMAN; MEDICAID; MEDICARE; MORTALITY; PREDICTION; REIMBURSEMENT; RISK ASSESSMENT; AGED; COMPARATIVE STUDY; ECONOMICS; FEMALE; HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION; INSURANCE; LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE; MALE; STATISTICS AND NUMERICAL DATA; UNITED STATES; VERY ELDERLY;

AGED; AGED, 80 AND OVER; FEMALE; HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES; HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS; HUMANS; INSURANCE SELECTION BIAS; MALE; MEDICARE; MEDICARE PART C; PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT; RISK ADJUSTMENT; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84871862112     PISSN: 02782715     EISSN: 15445208     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0345     Document Type: Article

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