Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research Agenda

European Law Journal

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-21

  Curtin, Deirdre ^a   Hofmann, Herwig ^a   Mendes, Joana ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LUXEMBOURG   (Luxembourg)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84871683314     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12010     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Deirdre Curtin and Joana Mendes, Professor of European Law and Assistant Professor, University of Amsterdam; Herwig C. H. Hofmann, Professor of European and Transnational Public Law, University of Luxembourg. The contributions to this special edition build on work undertaken by the members of the working group on 'rule-making', of the Research Network on EU Administrative Law-ReNEUAL (http://www.reneual.eu), and were presented and discussed at conferences and workshops in Amsterdam and Luxembourg in 2011.
2. See further, D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2009).
3. On the structure of the EU administration, see, among others, E. Chiti, 'The Administrative Implementations of European Union Law: A Taxonomy and Its Implications', in H. Hofmann and A. Türk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, 2009), at 9; J. Ziller, 'Exécution Centralisée et Execution Partagée: le Fédéralisme d'Exécution en Droit de l'Union Européenne', in J. Dutheil de la Rochère (ed), L'exécution du Droit de l'Union, Entre Mécanismes Communautaires et Droits Nationaux (Bruylant, 2009), at 111; E. Schmidt-Aβmann, 'Introduction: European Composite Administration and the Role of European Administrative Law', in O. Jansen and B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), The European Composite Administration (Intersentia, 2011), at 1
4. The contributors to this special issue use different terms, which reflect the diverse approaches to this topic. In some cases, the terms used are more adequate to their specific object of analysis (non-legislative rule-making, stricto sensu, to refer to delegated and implementing acts under Arts 290 and 291 TFEU; post-legislative rule-making).
5. D. M. Trubek and L. Trubek, 'New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation', (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 539
6. Respectively, Reg (EC) 182/2011 of 16 February 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers, OJ 2011L 55/13; Council Reg 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Art 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ 1999L 83/1; Council Reg (EC) No. 1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, OJ 2009L 343/51; Reg (EU) 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European supervisory authority (European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)), amending Dec No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Dec 2009/77/EC, OJ 2010L 331/84.
7. On founding principles, see A. von Bogdandy, 'Founding Principles', in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, 2010), at 11, 21-23.
8. E. Schmidt-Aβmann, La Teoría General del Derecho Administrativo Como Sistema (Marcial Pons, 2003), at 358
9. M. McCubbins etal., 'Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control', (1987) 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 243, at 246 and 255 (referring to the US context).
10. Directly, in the cases in which executive rule-making is adopted directly on the basis of the founding norms (the EU treaties).
11. J. J. G. Canotilho, 'Procedimento Administrativo e Defesa do Ambiente', (1991) Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência, a.123, n. 3798, 261-270, at 264.
12. This formulation of the problem goes back to F. Werner, 'Verwaltungsrecht als Konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht', (1959) 74 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 527-533
13. J. Ziller, 'Separation of Powers in the European Union's Intertwined System of Government. A Treaty Based Analysis for the Use of Political Scientists and Constitutional Lawyers', (2008) LXXIII Il Politico 133, at 138, 147-152; K. Lenaerts and M. Desomer, 'Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? Simplification of Legal Instruments and Procedures', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 744, at 750.
14. A. von Bogdandy, 'The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty for International Organizations', (2012) 23 European Law Journal 315
15. See, eg, Case C-310/04, Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, para 123, 130: '[a] proper study of the effects of that reform on the profitability of cotton production requires an examination of the consequences the reform is liable to produce for ginning undertaking situated in the production regions'. See also Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223, para 79. The Court of Justice of the European Union now has established case-law reviewing the legality of a measure under the principle of proportionality by establishing whether there is proof of the respect of the duty of care: Case C-176/09, Luxembourg v EP and Council [2011] ECR I-nyr of 12 May 2011, para 65; Case C-58/08, Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I-nyr of 8 June 2010, para 55.
16. See, eg, M. O'Neill, 'The Rights of Access to Community-Held Documentation as a General Principle of EC Law', (1998) 4 European Public Law 403;
17. P. Settembri, 'Transparency and the EU Legislator: "Let He Who Is Without Sin Cast the First Stone"', (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies 637. See further, A. Meijer etal., 'Open Government: Connecting Vision and Voice', (March 2012) 78 (1), Special Issue International Review of the Administrative Science 10-29
18. See further, U. Öberg, 'Public Access to Documents after the Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty: Much Ado about Nothing?' (1998) 2 European Union Online Papers
19. See, eg, G. Brandsma, D. Curtin and A. Meijer, 'How Transparent are EU "Comitology" Committees in Practice?' (2008) 14 European Law Journal 819
20. See D. Stasavage, 'Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining', (2004) 58 International Organization 667
21. On this case-law, see further D. Curtin, 'Citizens' Fundamental Right of Access to Information: An Evolving Digital Passepartout?' (2002) 37 Common Market Law Review 7
22. See further, eg, Case T-194/94, Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v Council [1995] ECR II-2765 and Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistfo'rbundet (Swedish Union of Journalists) v Council [1998] ECR II-2289.
23. See further D. Curtin, 'Betwixt and between: Democracy and Transparency in the Governance of the EU', in J. Winter, D. Curtin, A. Kellerman and B. de Witte (eds), Reforming the Treaty on European Union (Kluwer Law International, 1996), at 95
24. See Reg (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ 2001, at 43. See further European Commission, 'Green Paper: Public Access to Documents Held by the Institutions of the European Community. A Review', COM (2007) 185 final (18 May 2007). See, too, Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the Outcome of the Public Consultation on the Review of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, SEC (2008) 29/2 (16 January 2008).
25. See further J. Helikoski and P. Leino, 'Darkness at the Break of Noon: the Case Law on Regulation No. 1049/2001 on Access to Documents', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 735
26. See further L. Cotino, 'Theory and Reality of Public Access to EU Information', in D. Curtin, A. Kellermann and S. Blockmans (eds), The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (Kluwer, 2005), at 233
27. See further F. Maini, J. Villeneuve and M. Pasquier, 'Less is More'? The Commission Proposal on Access to EU Documents and the Proper Limits of Transparency', Revue Française d'Administration Publique, 2011/1 (no 137-138), 155-170
28. For an overview of the activities of the ombudsman in this respect, see, I. Harden, 'The European Ombudsman's Efforts to Increase Openness in the Union', in V. Deckmyn (ed), Increasing Transparency in the European Union (European Institute of Public Administration, 2002), at 123, in particular at 130 et seq.
29. European Ombudsman, European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, available in the latest version at http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/
30. See, too, C. Harlow, 'Transparency in the European Union: Weighing the Public and Private Interest', in J. Wouters, L. Verhey and P. Kiiver (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond Lisbon (Intersentia, 2009), at 209
31. See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm.
32. See Commission Register of Interest Representatives, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do?locale=en. See the critical initial report by The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU), Commission Lobby Register Fails Transparency Test, http://www.alter-eu.org/en/system/files/publications/Commission+Register+Fails+Transparency+Test.pdf.
33. See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/faq_en.htm.
34. G. Brandsma, D. Curtin and A. Meijer, 'How Transparent Are EU "Comitology" Committees in Practice?' (2008) 14 European Law Journal 819
35. E. Schmidt-Aβmann, 'La Legitimación de la Administración Como Concepto Jurídico', (1993) 234 Documentación Administrativa 163, at 211.
36. This is supported by the interplay between Art 10 and Art 11 of the TEU, and in particular by Art 10(1). See, too, B. Kohler-Koch, 'Zivilgesellschaftliche Partizipation: Zugewinn an Demokratie Oder Pluralisierung der Europaischen Lobby?' in B. Kohler-Koch and C. Quittkat (eds), Die Entzauberung Partizipativer Demokratie, Zur Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft bei der Demokratisierung von EU Governance (Campus Verlag, 2010), at 241
37. See T. Hueller, 'Assessing EU Strategies for Publicity', (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 563; and D. Naurin, Deliberation Behind Closed Doors: Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union (ECPR Press, 2007).
38. See, among many others, Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission [1974] ECR 1063; Case 234/84, Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, para 27; Case C-135/92, Fiskano v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, para 39; Case T-260/94, Air Inter v Commission [1997] ECR II-997, para 60. See also Art 41, para 2, sub a of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. See, further E. Barbier de la Serre, 'Procedural Justice in the European Community Case-Law Concerning the Rights of the Defence: Essentialist and Instrumental Trends', (2006) 12 European Public Law 225
39. Commission Communication, 'An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups' (Communication 93/C63/02, of 12 of December 1992, SEC/92/2272 final), available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/civil_society/interest_groups/index_en.htm. European Governance. A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001; see further J. Mendes, Participation in European Union Rulemaking: A Rights-Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2011), chapter 3, sections 3.1 and 3.2.
40. ibid. This claim is buttressed by the draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his inquiry into complaint 2558/2009/(TN)DK against the European Commission, which stresses equality and transparency as pillars of participatory democracy (pt. 9).
41. Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue-General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission (COM(2002)704), 11 December 2002, at 15.
42. Commission, 'Impact Assessment Guidelines', 15 January 2009, SEC(2009) 92, at 6 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf), emphasis added.
43. The 2009 Guidelines preceded the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and hence the creation of the category of delegated acts. However, at first sight, there are no reasons to support a literal interpretation of the guidelines, according to which these acts would be a priori excluded from impact assessment procedure. An example confirms this: by legislative determination, the Commission needs to assess the impact of delegated acts adopted on the basis of Dir 2010/30/EU of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products, OJ L 153/1; Art 10(3)(b). See further A. Alemanno and A. Meuwese in this issue.
44. On the lack of transparency of the Commission's selection of initiatives that undergo impact assessments, see European Court of Auditors, 'Impact Assessments in the EU Institutions: Do They Support Decision Making?' Special Report No. 3/2010, at 28 and 46.
45. See, however, A. Alemanno and A. Meuwese in this issue.
46. Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman concerning his inquiry into complaint 640/2011/AN against the European Commission (24 November 2011).
47. Case T-521/93, Atlanta and others v Council and Commission [1996] ECR II-1707, para 70-74; Case C-104/97 P, Atlanta and others v Commission and Council [1999] ECR I-6983, para 35-38.
48. Case C-104/97 P, Atlanta and others v Commission and Council [1999] ECR I-6983, para 70.
49. See, in particular, Cases T-211/02, Tieland Signal Ltd v Commission [2002] ECR II-3781, para 37; Case T-54/99, max.mobil v Commission [2002] ECR II-313, para 48-51; Case C-449/98, P IECC v Commission [2001] ECR I-3875, para 45; Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223, para 79; Case T-95/96, Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission [1998] ECR II-3407, para 53; Joined cases 142/84 and 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487, para 20.
50. See, in particular, Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München- Mitte [1991] ECR I-5469, para 14.
51. H.-P. Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Hart Publishing, 1999), at 103-105 See on the principle of the equality of arms Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, para 72 with many further references in the case-law.
52. Joined Cases T-371 and 394/94, British Airways and others and British Midlands Airways v Commission [1998] ECR II-2405, para 95.
53. Also protected by Art 41(1) CFR (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). C-248/99 P, Monsanto [2002] ECR I-1, para 91-93. However, the Court did not annul the Commission's contested act on that basis, since it concluded that the appellant had not established that the decision at issue was not actually, in that specific case, adopted in disregard of the principle of sound administration and the duty of care.
54. See, eg, the situation in Case C-310/04, Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, para 123, 130.
55. A. G. Sharpston, in a matter concerning a Spanish support scheme for cotton producers, referred to the obligation of the institutions to explore the element of a decision fully, prior to taking a decision, as the obligation to undertake an 'impact study'. This obligation is linked to the principle of proportionality insofar as it imposes 'an obligation on Community institutions at least to satisfy themselves that the proposed measures are prima facie adequate to attain the legitimate aims pursued'. Opinion of A. G. Sharpston in Case C-310/04, Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, para 80. The violation of the duty to care by the institutions was so severe that they were criticised as appearing arbitrary: 'In the absence of any impact study, certain choices made by the Commission and the Council appear arbitrary' (para 94).
56. Case C-176/09, Luxembourg v EP and Council [2011] ECR I-nyr of 12 May 2011, para 65; Case C-58/08, Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I-nyr of 8 June 2010, para 55; Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical [2010] ECR I-nyr of 8 July 2010, para 29, 36, 57. In Afton, the court points out that this line of reasoning holds even though the impact assessment undertaken by the Commission was not binding on the Parliament or Council taking a legislative decision based on the Commission proposal. A similar reasoning might apply if the Commission has discretion to decide on the basis of an agency proposal where the agency was in charge of undertaking the in-depth impact assessment of a proposed measure.
57. H. Hofmann and A. Morini, 'The Pluralisation of EU Executive-Constitutional Aspects of "Agencification"', (2012) 37 European Law Review 419-442
58. H. Hofmann, G. Rowe and A. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 26
59. eg Art 4, 5 of Reg 881/2004 of the EP and Council on the establishment of the European Railway Agency.
60. eg European Air Safety Agency (EASA) Management Board Decision 01-2012 amending and replacing Decision 08-2007 concerning the procedure to be applied by the agency for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (rule-making procedure) of 13 March 2012.
61. This is also a result from lacking legal basis for a common set of procedural rules prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which by including Art 298 TFEU has created a legal basis for some overarching rules and procedures. Only few aspects of administrative procedures have so far been regulated by EU law in a cross-policy fashion. These include comitology, executive agencies, the financial regulation, as well as certain aspects of data protection (in the EU context) and access to data provisions, the EU language regime, staff matters, as well as to a certain degree impact assessment rules.
62. Examples are the implementation of obligations under agreements entered into by the EU under public international law, such as the various agreements concluded in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that hold ample examples for such obligations. EU policies (like those of the Member States) are often directly influenced by developments undertaken in contexts of public international law. Rule-making, to take some concrete examples, can be influenced by UN Security Council decisions on anti-terror measures. It can also be influenced by obligations arising from the WTO's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) or Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) agreements, containing obligations of mutual recognition of foreign-non-EU-regulatory approaches.
63. The recent establishment of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA Dir 2010/78/EU) provides such powers in Arts 10 and 15 of the regulations establishing the European Banking Authority (EBA, Reg 1093/2010, [2010] OJ L331/12), the ESMA (Reg 1095/2010, [2010] OJ L331/84) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA, Reg 1094/2010, [2010] OJ L331/48). The three supervisory authorities are called not only to adopt preparatory measures, but also draft regulatory and implementing standards. These standards are preparatory measures to be adopted by the Commission under Art 290 and 291 TFEU.
64. eg the obligation of the ESA to undertake cost-benefit analysis and consultation of stakeholders by the agencies.
65. See, eg, A. Alemanno, 'A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment: When Ex Ante Evaluation Meets Ex Post Judicial Control', (2011) 17 European Public Law 485-505
66. eg under Art 17(2) of the legal basis creating the EASA (Reg No 216/2008, [2008] OJ L79/1), or Arts 10 and 15 of the regulations establishing the EBA (Reg 1093/2010, [2010] OJ L331/12), the ESMA (Reg 1095/2010, [2010] OJ L331/84) and the EIOPA (Reg 1094/2010, [2010] OJ L331/48).
67. eg Art 13(1) of the legal basis of the ESA (Dir 2010/78/EU) provides such powers in Arts 10 and 15 of the regulations establishing the EBA (Reg 1093/2010, [2010] OJ L331/12), the ESMA (Reg 1095/2010, [2010] OJ L331/84) and the EIOPA (Reg 1094/2010, [2010] OJ L331/48).
68. See, eg, the discussion in A. Töller and H. Hofmann, 'Democracy and the Reform of Comitology', in M. Andenas and A. Türk (eds), Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EU (Kluwer, 2000), at 25-50 with further references.