The Present Crisis. A Trump for a Renewed Political Economy

Review of Political Economy

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-38

  Boyer, Robert ^a  

^a Institut des Ameriques   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84871191854     PISSN: 09538259     EISSN: 14653982     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2013.736262     Document Type: Article

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