Formal security analysis of australian e-passport implementation

Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology Series

Volumn 81, Issue , 2008, Pages 75-82

  Vijayakrishnan, P ^a   Pieprzyk, Josef ^a   Wang, Huaxiong ^a  

^a MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Electronic passport; Formal methods; Model checking

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATED PROCESSING; E-PASSPORT; ELECTRONIC PASSPORTS; FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS; FORMAL VERIFICATIONS; MODEL CHECKING TOOLS; SECURITY ANALYSIS; SECURITY GOALS;

FORMAL METHODS; MODEL CHECKING; SECURITY SYSTEMS;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 84871181622     PISSN: 14451336     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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