A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Model of Market Coupling in the European Power System

Networks and Spatial Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 503-560

  Oggioni, Giorgia ^a   Smeers, Yves ^b   Allevi, Elisabetta ^a   Schaible, Siegfried ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^c CHUNG YUAN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Counter trading; European electricity market; Generalized Nash Equilibrium; Market coupling; Quasi Variational Inequalities

Indexed keywords

COUNTER-TRADING; ELECTRICITY MARKET; GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM; MARKET COUPLING; QUASI VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES;

DESIGN; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; VARIATIONAL TECHNIQUES;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84871131389     PISSN: 1566113X     EISSN: 15729427     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11067-011-9166-7     Document Type: Article

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