Local government, polluting enterprise and environmental pollution: Based on MATLAB software

Journal of Software

Volumn 7, Issue 10, 2012, Pages 2182-2188

  Guo, Zhiyi ^a   Zheng, Zhousheng ^a  

^a LANZHOU UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Decentralization reform; Enterprise; Environmental pollution; Local government; MATLAB

Indexed keywords

DECENTRALIZATION REFORM; ECONOMIC FACTORS; ECONOMIC GROWTHS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PROBLEM; ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTIONS; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; MATLAB- SOFTWARE; POLITICAL SYSTEMS; POLLUTION PROBLEMS; SOFTWARE MATLAB;

ECONOMICS; FUNCTIONS; MATLAB;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 84870500504     PISSN: 1796217X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.4304/jsw.7.10.2182-2188     Document Type: Article

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