Evaluation of the vulnerability of phasor measurement units to GPS spoofing attacks

International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection

Volumn 5, Issue 3-4, 2012, Pages 146-153

  Shepard, Daniel P ^a   Humphreys, Todd E ^a   Fansler, Aaron A ^b  

^a The University of Texas at Austin   (United States)

^b Northrop Grumman Information Systems   (United States)

Author keywords

Electrical power grid; GPS spoofing; Phasor measurement units; Vulnerabilities

Indexed keywords

CONTROL ARCHITECTURE; ELECTRICAL POWER; GPS SIGNALS; HUMAN POWER; MAXIMUM PHASE; ME-XICO; PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT; PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT (PMUS); REMEDIAL CONTROL; SETPOINTS; SPOOFING ATTACKS; TIME STAMPS; TIMING ERRORS; VULNERABILITIES;

AUTOMATION; CONTROL; ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION; ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM INTERCONNECTION;

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM;

EID: 84870322696     PISSN: 18745482     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2012.09.003     Document Type: Article

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