How the problem of consciousness could emerge in robots

Minds and Machines

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 277-297

  Molyneux, Bernard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Artificial consciousness; Consciousness; Explanatory gap; Hard problem; Identification regress; Identity; Mysterian; Reduction; Strong AI

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL CONSCIOUSNESS; CONSCIOUSNESS; EXPLANATORY GAP; HARD PROBLEMS; IDENTITY; MYSTERIAN;

ALGORITHMS; REDUCTION;

ROBOTS;

EID: 84869802592     PISSN: 09246495     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-012-9285-z     Document Type: Article

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