Agglomeration bonus in small and large local networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination

Ecological Economics

Volumn 84, Issue , 2012, Pages 142-152

  Banerjee, Simanti ^a   Kwasnica, Anthony M ^b   Shortle, James S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agglomeration Bonus; Coordination failure; Experiments; Local networks

Indexed keywords

AGGLOMERATION; CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT; ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; INCENTIVE; LABORATORY METHOD; LAND USE CHANGE; LANDOWNER; SPATIAL ANALYSIS; SUBSIDY SYSTEM;

EID: 84869139670     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.09.005     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Bartelt P.E., Klaver R.W., Porter W.P. Modeling amphibian energetics, habitat suitability, and movements of western toads, Anaxyrus (=Bufo) boreas, across present and future landscapes. Ecological Modeling 2010, 221(22):2675-2686.
2. Berninghaus S.K., Ehrhart K.M. Coordination and information: recent experimental evidence. Economic Letters 2001, 73(3):345-351.
3. Berninghaus S.K., Schwalbe U. Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1996, 6(3):297-312.
4. Berninghaus S.K., Ehrhart K.M., Keser C. Conventions and local interaction structures: experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 2002, 39(2):177-205.
5. Blume L.E. The statistical mechanisms of strategic interactions. Games and Economic Behavior 1993, 5:387-424.
6. Blume A., Ortmann A. The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto ranked equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory 2007, 132(1):274-290.
7. Brandts J., Cooper D.J. Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: an experimental study. Experimental Economics 2006, 9(4):407-423.
8. Brandts J., Cooper D.J. It's what you say, not what you pay: an experimental study of manager-employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure. Journal of the European Economic Association 2007, 5(6):1223-1268.
9. Cachon G.P., Camerer C.F. Loss avoidance and forward induction in experimental coordination games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1996, 111(1):165-194.
10. Carvell C., Meek W.R., Pywell R.R., Goulson D., Nowakowski M. Comparing the efficacy of agri-environment schemes to enhance bumble bee abundance and diversity on arable field margins. Journal of Applied Ecology 2007, 44:29-40.
11. Cassar A. Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 2007, 58(2):209-230.
12. Cooper R.W., DeJong D.V., Forsythe R., Ross T.W. Selection criteria in coordination games: some experimental results. The American Economic Review 1990, 80(1):218-233.
13. Cooper R., De Jong D., Forsythe R., Ross T. Communication in coordination games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1992, 107:739-771.
14. Devetag G., Ortmann A. When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory. Experimental Economics 2007, 10:331-344.
15. Eisner T., Lubchenco J., Wilson E.O., Wilcove D., Bean M. Building a scientifically sound policy for protecting endangered species. Science 1995, 268:1231-1232. (on).
16. Ellison G. Learning, local interaction and coordination. Econometrica 1993, 61:1047.
17. Fischbacher U. Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Experimental Economics 2007, 10:171-178.
18. Goldman H.L., Thompson B.H., Daily G.C. Institutional incentives for managing the landscape: inducing cooperation for the provision of ecosystem services. Ecological Economics 2007, 64:333-343.
19. Harsanyi J.C., Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games 1988, MIT Press Books 1.
20. Huxel G.R., Hastings A. Habitat loss, fragmentation and restoration. Restoration Ecology 1999, 7(3):309-315.
21. Kirwan B., Lubowski R.N., Roberts M.J. How cost effective are land retirement auctions? Estimating the difference between payment and willingness to accept in the Conservation Reserve Programme. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 2005, 87:1239.
22. Knez M., Camerer C. Creating expectational assets in the laboratory: coordination in weakest link games. Strategic Management Journal 1994, 15:101-119.
23. Latacz-Lohmann U., Van der Hamsvoort C. Auctioning conservation contracts: a theoretical analysis and an application. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1997, 79(2):407-418.
24. Lewis D.J., Plantinga A.J., Wu J. Targeting incentives to reduce habitat fragmentation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 2009, 91(4):1080-1096.
25. Margules C.R., Pressey R.L. Systematic conservation planning. Nature 2000, 405.
26. Muñoz-Piña C., Guevera A., Torres J.M., Braña J. Paying for the hydrological services of Mexico's forests: analysis, negotiations and results. Ecological Economics 2008, 65:725-736.
27. Parkhurst G.M., Shogren J.F. Spatial incentives to coordinate contiguous habitat. Ecological Economics 2007, 64(2):344-355.
28. Parkhurst G.M., Shogren J.F., Bastian C., Kivi P., Donner J., Smith R.B.W. Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation. Ecological Economics 2002, 41(2):305-328.
29. Reeson A.F., Rodriguez L.C., Whitten S.M., Williams K., Nolles K., Windle J., Rolfe J. Adapting auctions for the provision of ecosystem services at the landscape scale. Ecological Economics 2011, 70(9):1621-1627.
30. Saunders D.A., Hobbs R.J., Margules C.R. Biological consequences of ecosystem fragmentation: a review. Conservation Biology 1991, 5:18-27.
31. Smith R.B.W., Shogren J.F. Protecting Species on Private Land. Protecting Species in the United States: Biological Needs, Political Realities, Economic Choices 2001, 326-342. Cambridge University Press, New York. J. Shogren, J. Tschirhart (Eds.).
32. Smith R.B.W., Shogren J.F. Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2002, 43:169-187.
33. Stewart M.B. Maximum simulated likelihood estimation of random-effects dynamic probit models with autocorrelated errors. The Stata Journal 2006, 6(2):256-272.
34. Stouffer P.C., Bierregaard R.O. Use of Amazonian forest fragments by understory insectivorous birds. Ecology 1995, 76:2429-2445.
35. Straub P.G. Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 1995, 35(4):339-363.
36. Sundseth D. County Director 2009, USDA Farm Service Agency, Tangent, OR.
37. United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program-Oregon State: Fact Sheet http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/creporfactsheet11.pdf.
38. Van Huyck J.B., Battalio R.C., Beil R.O. Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. The American Economic Review 1990, 80:234-248.
39. Van Huyck J.B., Battalio R.C., Beil R.O. Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1991, 106(3):885-910.
40. Van Huyck J.B., Battalio R.C., Rankin F.W. Evidence on learning in coordination games. Experimental Economics 2007, 10(3):205-220.
41. Warziniack T., Shogren J.F., Parkhurst G. Creating contiguous forest habitat: an experimental examination on incentives and communication. Journal of Forest Economics 2007, 13(2-3):191-207.
42. Weidenholzer S. Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature. Games 2010, 1(4):551-585.
43. Windle J., Rolfe J., McCosker J., Lingard A. A conservation auction for landscape linkage in the southern Desert Uplands, Queensland. Rangeland Journal 2009, 31:127-135.