An approach to vickrey-based resource allocation in the presence of monopolistic sellers

Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology Series

Volumn 99, Issue , 2009, Pages 77-83

  Pham, H N ^a   Teo, Y M ^a   Thoai, N ^b   Nguyen, T A ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b University of Technology   (Viet Nam)

Author keywords

incentive compatible; Mechanism design; Monopoly; VCG

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MARKET SHARE; MARKET-BASED APPROACH; MECHANISM DESIGN; MONOPOLISTIC SELLER; MONOPOLY; PEER TO PEER; PRICING METHODS; RESOURCE SHARING; SIMULATION ANALYSIS; STRATEGY PROOFS; VCG; VCG MECHANISM;

COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; GRID COMPUTING; MACHINE DESIGN; RESEARCH;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84869125855     PISSN: 14451336     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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