Rethinking biosafety in research on potential pandemic pathogens

mBio

Volumn 3, Issue 5, 2012, Pages

  Lipsitch, Marc ^a   Bloom, Barry R ^a  

^a HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868366985     PISSN: 21612129     EISSN: 21507511     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1128/mBio.00360-12     Document Type: Note

References (10)

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10. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2007. National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Appendix B. www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nbaf_feis_appendix_b.pdf. Accessed 13 May 2012.