Downstream R&D, raising rivals' costs, and input price contracts

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 79-96

  Banerjee, Samiran ^a   Lin, Ping ^b  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b LINGNAN UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Fixed price contract; Raising rivals' cost; Vertical R D

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867957063     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00010-3     Document Type: Article

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