Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the Evolutionary Metaphor

Computational Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 139-156

  Dixon, Huw David ^a   Wallis, Steven ^b   Moss, Scott ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

^b MANCHESTER METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cournot; duopoly; evolution

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867921257     PISSN: 09277099     EISSN: 15729974     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020922214711     Document Type: Article

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