Changing the mind: Mindreading, intentional action and consciousness;Cambiare la mente: Mindreading, azione intenzionale e coscienza

Sistemi Intelligenti

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 489-520

  Paglieri, Fabio ^a   Castelfranchi, Cristiano ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGIES   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867875136     PISSN: 11209550     EISSN: 19738226     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1422/28258     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. Ainslie G. (2001), Breakdown of Will, New York, Cambridge University Press
2. Arkes H. e Blumer C. (1985), The Psychology of Sunk Cost, in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 35, pp. 124-140
3. Audi R. (1979), Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment, in Noûs, 13, pp. 173-196
4. Bargh J. e Chartrand T. (1999), The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, in American Psychologist, 54, pp. 462-479
5. Bargh J. e Ferguson M. (2000), Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes, in Psychological Bulletin, 126, pp. 925-945
6. Bargh J., Gollwitzer P., Lee-Chai A., Barndollar K. e Troetschel R. (2001), The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals, in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, pp. 1014-1027
7. Baron-Cohen S. (1995), Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
8. Baron-Cohen S. (1999), The Evolution of a Theory of Mind, in M. Corballis e S. Lea (a cura di), The Descent of Mind: Psychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 261-277
9. Bem D. (1972), Self-perception Theory, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 6, pp. 1-62
10. Bénabou R. e Tirole J. (2004), Willpower and Personal Rules, in Journal of Political Economy, 112, pp. 848-886
11. Bratman M. (1987), Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
12. Bratman M., Israel D. e Pollack M. (1988), Plans and Resource-bounded Practical Reasoning, in Computational Intelligence, 4, pp. 349-355
13. Brentano F. (1874), Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, trad. it. riediz. 1924, a cura di O. Kraus, La psicologia dal punto di vista empirico, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1997
14. Carruthers P. (2005), Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-order Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press
15. Carruthers P. e Smith P. (a cura di) (1996), Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
16. Castelfranchi C. (1990), Social Power: A Missed Point in DAI, MA and HCI, in Y. Demazeau e J.P. Mueller (a cura di), Decentralized Artificial Intelligence, Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 49-62
17. Castelfranchi C. (1995), Self-awareness: Notes for a Computational Theory of Intrapsychic Social Interaction, in G. Trautteur (a cura di), Consciousness, Napoli, Bibliopolis, pp. 55-80
18. Castelfranchi C., Miceli M. e Cesta A. (1992), Dependence Relations among Autonomous Agents, in E. Werner e Y. Demazeau (a cura di), Decentralized Artificial Intelligence III, Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 215-231
19. Castelfranchi C. e Paglieri F. (2007), The Role of Beliefs in Goal Dynamics: Prolegomena to a Constructive Theory of Intentions, in Synthese, 155, pp. 237-263
20. Castelfranchi C. e Parisi D. (1980), Linguaggio, conoscenze e scopi, Bologna, Il Mulino
21. Castelfranchi C. e Poggi I. (1998), Bugie, finzioni, sotterfugi. Per una scienza dell'inganno, Roma, Carocci
22. Chalmers D. (1996), The Conscious Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press
23. Clark A. (1997), Being there: Putting Brain, Body, and World together again, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
24. Cohen A.-L. e Gollwitzer P. (2006), If-then Plans and the Intentional Controls of Thoughts, Feelings, and Actions, in N. Sebanz e W. Prinz (a cura di), Disorders of Volition, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp. 151-171
25. Cohen P. e Levesque H. (1990), Intention is Choice with Commitment, in Artificial Intelligence, 42, pp. 213-261
26. Conte R. e Castelfranchi C. (1995), Cognitive and Social Action, London, UCL Press
27. Crick F. e Koch C. (1998), Consciousness and Neuroscience, in Cerebral Cortex, 8, pp. 97-107
28. Csibra G. e Gergely G. (2007), Obsessed with Goals: Functions and Mechanisms of Teleological Interpretation of Actions in Humans, in Acta Psychologica , 124, pp. 60-78
29. Daprati E., Franck N., Georgieff N., Proust J., Pacherie E., Dalery J. e Jeannerod M. (1997), Looking for the Agent: An Investigation into Consciousness of Action and Self-consciousness in Schizophrenic Patients, in Cognition, 65, pp. 71-96
30. Davidson D. (1970), How is Weakness of the Will Possible?, in J. Feinberg (a cura di), Moral Concepts, Oxford, Oxford University Press
31. Dennett D. (1984), Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
32. Dennett D. (1987), The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
33. Dennett D. (1991), Consciousness Explained, London, Allen Lane
34. De Vignemont F. e Fourneret P. (2004), The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the Who System, in Consciousness and Cognition , 13, pp. 1-19
35. Dongha P. (1994), Toward a Formal Model of Commitment for Resource Bounded Agents, in M.J. Wooldridge e N.R. Jennings (a cura di), Intelligent Agents @ ECAI-94, Berlin, Springer, pp. 86-101
36. Eco U. (1975), Trattato di semiotica generale, Milano, Bompiani
37. Eigsti I.-M., Zayas V., Mischel W., Shoda Y., Ayduk O., Dadlani M., Davidson M., Aber J. e Casey B. (2006), Predicting Cognitive Control from Preschool to Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood, in Psychological Science, 17, pp. 478-484
38. Elster J. (1979), Ulysses and the Sirens. Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, trad. it. Ulisse e le sirene, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983
39. Elster J. (a cura di) (1986), The Multiple Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, trad. it. L'io multiplo, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1991
40. Elster J. (2000), Ulysses Unbound. Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
41. Falcone R. e Castelfranchi C. (2001), The Socio-cognitive Dynamics of Trust: Does Trust Create Trust?, in R. Falcone, M. Singh e Y.H. Tan (a cura di), Trust in Cyber-societies: Integrating the Human and Artificial Perspectives, Berlin, Springer, pp. 55-72
42. Festinger L. (1957), A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford, Stanford University Press
43. Frith C. (1992), The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia, Hillsdale, LEA
44. Frith C. (2007), Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates our Mental World, London, Blackwell
45. Gallagher S. (2000), Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science, in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, pp. 14-21
46. Gallagher S. (2001), The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction?, in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, pp. 83-108
47. Gallese V. (2001), The Shared Manifold Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy, in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, pp. 33-50
48. Georgieff N. e Jeannerod M. (1998), Beyond Consciousness of External Reality: A Who System for Consciousness of Action and Self-consciousness, in Consciousness and Cognition, 7, pp. 465-477
49. Goldman A. (2005), Imitation, Mindreading, and Simulation, in S. Hurley e N. Chater (a cura di), Perspectives on Imitation: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Social Science, vol. 2, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp. 79-93
50. Gomes G. (1998), The Timing of Conscious Experience: A Critical Review and Reinterpretation of Libet's Research, in Consciousness and Cognition, 7, pp. 559-595
51. Gordon R. (2005), Intentional Agents like Myself, in S. Hurley e N. Chater (a cura di), Perspectives on Imitation: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Social Science, vol. 2, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp. 95-106
52. Gygax L. (2000), Hiding Behaviour of Long-tailed Macaques (Macaca Fascicularis): II. Use of Hiding Places During Aggressive Interactions, in Ethology, 106, pp. 441-451
53. Haggard P., Clark S. e Kalogeras J. (2002), Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness, in Nature Neuroscience, 5, pp. 382-385
54. Hare B., Call J. e Tomasello M. (2006), Chimpanzees Deceive a Human Competitor by Hiding, in Cognition, 101, pp. 495-514
55. Hauser M. (1997), Minding the Behaviour of Deception, in A. Whiten e R. Byrne (a cura di), Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 112-143
56. Heyes C. (1998), Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, pp. 101-148
57. Hirata S. e Matsuzawa T. (2001), Tactics to Obtain a Hidden Food Item in Chimpanzee Pairs (Pan Troglodytes), in Animal Cognition, 4, pp. 285-295
58. Holton R. (1999), Intention and Weakness of Will, in Journal of Philosophy, 96, pp. 241-262
59. Holton R. (2003), How is Strength of Will Possible?, in S. Stroud e C. Tappolet (a cura di), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 39-67
60. Hurley S. (1998), Consciousness in Action, London, Harvard University Press
61. Hutto D. (2004), The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology, in Mind & Language, 19, pp. 548-573
62. Jennings N. (1993), Commitments and Conventions: The Foundation of Coordination in Multi-agent Systems, in The Knowledge Engineering Review, 3, pp. 223-250
63. Karmiloff-Smith A. (1992), Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
64. Keller I. e Heckhausen H. (1990), Readiness Potentials Preceding Spontaneous Motor Acts: Voluntary vs. Involuntary Control, in Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 76, pp. 351-361
65. Krebs J. e Dawkins R. (1984), Animal Signals: Mindreading and Manipulation, in J. Krebs e N. Davies (a cura di), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, 2a ed., Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 380-402
66. Kriegel U. e Williford K. (a cura di) (2006), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
67. Lau H., Rogers R. e Passingham R. (2007), Manipulating the Experienced Onset of Intention after Action Execution, in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 19, pp. 1-10
68. Libet B. (1985), Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, pp. 529-566
69. Mele A. (1995), Autonomous Agents: From Self-control to Autonomy, Oxford, Oxford University Press
70. Metzinger T. (a cura di) (2000), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
71. Metzinger T. (2003), Being no One, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
72. Metzinger T. (2006), Conscious Volition and Mental Representation: Toward a more Fine-grained Analysis, in N. Sebanz e W. Prinz (a cura di), Disorders of Volition, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp. 19-48
73. Miceli M. e Castelfranchi C. (1995), Le difese della mente, Roma, La Nuova Italia Scientifica
74. Mischel W. e Ayduk O. (2004), Willpower in a Cognitive-affective Processing System: The Dynamics of Delay of Gratification, in K. Vohs e R. Baumeister (a cura di), Handbook of Self-regulation: Research, Theory, and Applications, New York, Guilford Press, pp. 99-129
75. Nichols S. e Stich S. (2003), Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-awareness, and Understanding other Minds, Oxford, Oxford University Press
76. Paglieri F. e Castelfranchi C. (2008), Decidere il futuro: scelta intertemporale e teoria degli scopi, in Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, 35, 4, pp. 739-771
77. Perconti P. (2003), Leggere le menti, Milano, Bruno Mondadori
78. Perner J. (1991), Understanding the Representational Mind, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
79. Prencipe A. e Zelazo P.D. (2005), Development of Affective Decision Making for Self and Other: Evidence for the Integration of First-and Third-person Perspectives, in Psychological Science, 16, pp. 501-505
80. Proust J. (2006), Agency in Schizophrenia from a Control Theory Viewpoint, in N. Sebanz e W. Prinz (a cura di), Disorders of Volition, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp. 87-118
81. Proust J. (2007), Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition?, in Synthese, 159, pp. 271-295
82. Rosas A. (2004), Mindreading, Deception and the Evolution of Kantian Moral Agents, in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 34, pp. 127-139
83. Rosenthal D. (2005), Consciousness and Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press
84. Rossetti Y. (1998), Implicit Short-lived Motor Representations of Space in Brain Damaged and Healthy Subjects, in Consciousness and Cognition, 7, pp. 520-558
85. Sellars W. (1956), Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in H. Feigl e M. Scriven (a cura di), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 253-329
86. Shallice T. (1988), From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
87. Shoham Y. (1993), Agent-oriented Programming, in Artificial Intelligence, 60, pp. 51-92
88. Sperber D. (2001), An Evolutionary Perspective on Testimony and Argumentation, in Philosophical Topics, 29, pp. 401-413
89. Sterelny K. (2003), Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition, Oxford, Blackwell
90. Sterelny K. (2005), Made by Each Other: Organisms and their Environment, in Biology and Philosophy, 20, pp. 21-36
91. Taillard M.-O. (2004), Adaptive Persuasion, in Working Papers in Linguistics, 16, pp. 247-263
92. Tomasello M. (1999), The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
93. Umiltà C. (2000), Consciousness and Conscious Experience, in K. Pawlik e M. Rosenzweig (a cura di), International Handbook of Psychology, San Francisco, Sage, pp. 223-232
94. van der Hoek W., Jamroga W. e Wooldridge M. (2007), Towards a Theory of Intention Revision, in Synthese, 155, pp. 265-290
95. Velmans M. (1991), Is Human Information Processing Conscious?, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14, pp. 651-726
96. Vygotsky L.S. (1962), Thought and Language, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
97. Wegner D. (2002), The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
98. Whiten A. e Byrne R. (1988), Tactical Deception in Primates, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11, pp. 233-273
99. Woodruff G. e Premack D. (1979), Intentional Communication in the Chimpanzee: The Development of Deception, in Cognition, 7, pp. 333-362