Jobless objects: Mathematical posits in crisis

Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 112-131

  Raley, Yvonne ^a  

^a Felician College   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867764681     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1515/9783110323689.112     Document Type: Chapter

References (20)

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5. Azzouni, Jody. 2000. “Stipulation, Logic and Ontological Independence.” Philosophica Mathematica, Vol. 8: 225-243.
6. Azzouni, Jody. 2004. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York, NY:Oxford University Press.
7. Baker, Alan. 2003. “Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, No. 2: 246-264.
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9. Balaguer, Mark. 1999. Review of Michael Resnik’s Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Philosophica Mathematica, Vol. 7: 108-126.
10. Benacerraf, Paul. 1973. Mathematical Truth. In Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, Second Edition, edited by Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1983: 403-420.
11. Cheyne, Colin and Charles Pigden. 1996. “Pythagorean Powers, or A Challenge to Platonism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 639-45.
12. Ellis, Brian. 1990. Truth and Objectivity. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.
13. Field, Hartry. 1980. Science Without Numbers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Princeton.
14. Field, Hartry. 1989. Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
15. Horgan, Terence. 1987. “Discussion: Science Nominalized Properly.” Philosophy of Science 54: 281-82.
16. McEvoy, Mark. 2004. “Is Reliabilism Compatible with Mathematical Knowledge?" Philosophical Forum XXXY, No. 4: 423-437.
17. Quine, W.V., 1948, ‘On What There is’, in Quine, From A Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980: 1-20.
18. Raley, Yvonne. 2007. “Ontology, Commitment, and Quine’s Criterion.” Philosophica Mathematica 15: 271-290.
19. Resnik, Michael. 1997. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. New York, NY: Oxford University Presss.
20. Yablo, Stephen. 2000, ‘A Paradox of Existence’, in Everett, A. and Hofweber, T. (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA: 275-312.