Organizational strategy, managerial decision-making, and market-based environmental policies: Utility company bidding behavior in the sulfur dioxide allowance trading auctions

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 6, 1997, Pages 471-489

  J Lober, Douglas ^a   Bailey, Michael ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867365787     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199709)18:6<471::AID-MDE848>3.0.CO;2-T     Document Type: Article

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