In-house capability and supply chain decisions

Omega (United Kingdom)

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 473-484

  Balachandran, Kashi R ^a   Wang, Hsiao Wen ^b   Li, Shu Hsing ^c   Wang, Taychang ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL CENTRAL UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^c NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Coordinated supply chains; Game theory; In house capability; Information sharing; Misappropriation; Outsourcing

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTORS; CRIME; GAME THEORY; OUTSOURCING;

COORDINATED SUPPLY CHAIN; END-PRODUCTS; HIGH END PRODUCTS; IN-HOUSE CAPABILITY; INFORMATION SHARING; INNOVATIVE PRODUCT; MISAPPROPRIATION; NEW RESULTS; PRODUCTION OPTION; PRODUCTION PROCESS;

SUPPLY CHAINS;

EID: 84867019818     PISSN: 03050483     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2012.01.003     Document Type: Article

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