Bond covenants and creditor protection: Economics and law, theory and practice, substance and process

European Business Organization Law Review

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 39-87

  Bratton, William W ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

agency costs; bank loans; bond covenants; bonds and bondholders; creditors' rights; legal capital; private placements; trust indentures

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866063049     PISSN: 15667529     EISSN: 17416205     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1566752906000395     Document Type: Article

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