Price elasticity of expenditure across health care services

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 824-841

  Duarte, Fabian ^a,b  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

Consumer behavior; Elasticity; Health economics; Health expenditures; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH EXPENDITURE; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH SERVICES; MORALITY; PRICE DYNAMICS; REFORM PROCESS;

ARTICLE; CHILE; ELASTICITY; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE FINANCING; HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH SERVICE; HEALTH STATUS; HUMAN; OUTPATIENT; PATIENT CARE; SEX DIFFERENCE; SOCIOECONOMICS; WELFARE;

ADULT; CHILE; COMMERCE; FEMALE; HEALTH EXPENDITURES; HEALTH SERVICES; HUMANS; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC;

CHILE;

EID: 84865994715     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.07.002     Document Type: Article

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