Computing shapley value in supermodular coalitional games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 7434 LNCS, Issue , 2012, Pages 568-579

  Liben Nowell, David ^a   Sharp, Alexa ^b   Wexler, Tom ^b   Woods, Kevin ^b  

^a CARLETON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b OBERLIN COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COALITIONAL GAME; CONVEX GAME; DETERMINISTIC ALGORITHMS; FAIR ALLOCATION; MARGINAL CONTRIBUTION; MONOTONICITY; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; RANDOMIZED ALGORITHMS; RANDOMIZED APPROXIMATION SCHEMES; SHAPLEY VALUE; SOLUTION CONCEPTS; SUPERMODULAR; SUPERMODULAR GAMES; SUPERMODULARITY;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84865632995     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32241-9_48     Document Type: Conference Paper

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