A connectionist ABM of social categorization processes

Advances in Complex Systems

Volumn 15, Issue 6, 2012, Pages

  Van Rooy, Dirk ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

agent based modeling; connectionism; Social influence; social psychology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865514697     PISSN: 02195259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219525912500774     Document Type: Conference Paper

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