Naughty beliefs

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 160, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 209-222

  Huddleston, Andrew ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Epistemology; Moore's paradox; Philosophy of mind

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865415991     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9714-5     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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