The superintelligent will: Motivation and instrumental rationality in advanced artificial agents

Minds and Machines

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 71-85

  Bostrom, Nick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

AI; Artificial intelligence; Goal; Instrumental reason; Intelligent agent; Superintelligence

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL AGENTS; GOAL; IN-BUILDINGS; INSTRUMENTAL REASON; ORTHOGONAL AXES; ORTHOGONALITY; SUPERINTELLIGENCE;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

MOTIVATION;

EID: 84865320990     PISSN: 09246495     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-012-9281-3     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Bostrom, N. (2003). Are you living in a computer simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211), 243-255.
2. Bostrom, N. (2006). What is a singleton? Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, 5(2), 48-54.
3. Bostrom, N. (2012). Information hazards: A Typology of potential harms from knowledge. Review of Contemporary Philosophy, 10, 44-79. (www.nickbostrom.com/information-hazards.pdf).
4. Chalmers, D. (2010). The singularity: A philosophical analysis. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17, 7-65.
5. Chislenko, A. (1997). Technology as extension of human functional architecture. Extropy Online. (project.cyberpunk.ru/idb/technology-as-extension. html).
6. de Blanc, P. (2011). Ontological crises in artificial agent's value systems. Manuscript. The singularity institute for artificial intelligence. (arxiv.org/pdf/1105.3821v1.pdf).
7. Dewey, D. (2011). Learning what to value. In J. Schmidhuber, K.R. Thorisson, & M. Looks (Eds.), Proceedings of the 4th conference on artificial general intelligence, AGI 2011 (pp. 309-314). Heidelberg: Springer.
8. Forgas, J., et al. (Eds.). (2009). The psychology of attitudes and attitude change. London: Psychology Press.
9. Lewis, D. (1988). Desire as belief. Mind, 97(387), 323-332.
10. Omohundro, S. (2008a). The basic AI drives. In P. Wang, B. Goertzel, and S. Franklin (eds.). Proceedings of the First AGI Conference, Vol. 171. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
11. Omohundro, S. (2008b). The nature of self-improving artificial intelligence. Manuscript. (selfaware systems.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/nature- of-self-improving-ai.pdf).
12. Omohundro, S. (2012). Rationally-shaped artificial intelligence. In Eden, A. et al. (eds.). The singularity hypothesis: A scientific and philosophical assessment (Springer, forthcoming).
13. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. (pp. 123-124). Reprinted and corrected edition, 1987. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15. Russell, S., & Norvig, P. (2010). Artificial intelligence: A modern approach (3rd ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
16. Sandberg, A., & Bostrom, N. (2008). Whole brain emulation: A roadmap. Technical Report 2008-3. Oxford: Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University. (www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/Reports/2008-3.pdf).
17. Shulman, C. (2010). Omohundro's "basic AI drives" and catastrophic risks. Manuscript. (singinst.org/upload/ai-resource-drives.pdf).
18. Sinhababu, N. (2009). The humean theory of motivation reformulated and defended. Philosophical Review, 118(4), 465-500.
19. Smith, M. (1987). The humean theory of motivation. Mind, 46(381), 36-61.
20. Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to calculation. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
21. Yudkowsky, E. (2008). Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk. In N. Bostrom, & M. Cirkovic (Eds.), Global catastrophic risks. (pp. 308-345; quote from p. 310). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Yudkowsky, E. (2011). Complex value systems are required to realize valuable futures. In J. Schmidhuber, K.R. Thorisson, & M. Looks (Eds.), Proceedings of the 4th conference on artificial general intelligence, AGI 2011 (pp. 388-393). Heidelberg: Springer.