Preferences under risk: Content-dependent behavior and psychological processing

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 2, Issue NOV, 2011, Pages

  Kusev, Petko ^a   van Schaik, Paul ^b  

^a KINGSTON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b TEESSIDE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865284515     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00269     Document Type: Note

References (16)

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