Learning from adverse events in the nuclear power industry: Organizational learning, policy making and normalization

Technology in Society

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 239-250

  Sanne, Johan M ^a  

^a LINKÖPING UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Improvement scripts; Normalization; Nuclear power; Organizational learning; Risk objects; Risk regulation

Indexed keywords

ADVERSE EVENTS; EXAMINATION PROCESS; IMPROVEMENT SCRIPTS; LEARNING FROM INCIDENTS; NORMALIZATION; NUCLEAR-POWER INDUSTRY; ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING; POLICY MAKING; RISK REGULATION; SAFETY CULTURE; SAFETY-CRITICAL; SENSEMAKING; SOCIAL SCIENTISTS;

DECISION MAKING; NUCLEAR ENERGY; NUCLEAR INDUSTRY;

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT;

INDUSTRIAL POLICY; LEARNING; NUCLEAR POWER PLANT; POLICY MAKING; RISK ASSESSMENT; STAKEHOLDER;

SWEDEN;

EID: 84864754893     PISSN: 0160791X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.techsoc.2012.07.002     Document Type: Article

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