Will geographical indications supply excessive quality?

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 567-587

  Mérel, Pierre ^a   Sexton, Richard J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

geographical indication; producer organization; product quality; quality choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864723606     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: 14643618     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbr056     Document Type: Review

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